Skip to main content

General Intensional Logic

  • Chapter
Handbook of Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 165))

Abstract

Intensional logic is that part of logic which treats inferences involving meanings or identities of meanings in some strict sense. The contrast is with extensional logic which requires for the statement and justification of its general principles only such concepts as truth and falsity, identity and difference of truth-values (of sentences or propositions), sets or classes, and co- extensiveness or divergence (of predicates or properties). Intensional logic requires in addition some such notions as synonymy, identity and difference of intension, proposition, property, or concept. Which of these ideas is to be taken as basic, or whether they are all reducible to some other, e.g. possible world, is at present quite uncertain.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Anderson, C. A.: 1977, ‘Some models for the logic of sense and denotation with an application to alternative (0)’, PhD dissertation, UCLA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, C. A.: 1980, ‘Some new axioms for the logic of sense and denotation: Alternative (0)’ Noûs 14, 217–234.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Church, A.: 1951, ‘A formulation of the logic of sense and denotation’, in Structure, Method, and Meaning, The Liberal Arts Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Church, A.: 1954, ‘Intensional isomorphism and identity of belief’, Philosophical Studies 5, 65–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Church, A.: 1973, ‘Outline of a revised formulation of the logic of sense and denotation (part I)’, Noûs 7, 24–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Church, A.: 1974, ‘Outline of a revised formulation of the logic of sense and denotation (part II)’,Noûs 8, 135–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallin, D.: 1975, Intentional and Higher-Order Modal Logic, North-Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henkin, L.: 1950, ‘Completeness in the theory of types’, J. Symbolic Logic 15, 81–91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S.: 1959, ‘A completeness theorem in modal logic’, J. Symbolic Logic 24, 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S.: 1971, ‘Identity and necessity’, in M. Munitz (ed.),Identity and lndividuation, New York Univ. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, C. I. and Langford, C. H.: 1932, Symbolic Logic, Century.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parsons, C.: 1982, ‘Intensional logic in extensional language’, J. Symbolic Logic 47, 289–328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smullyan, A.: 1948, ‘Modality and description’, J. Symbolic Logic 13, 31–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Anderson, C.A. (1984). General Intensional Logic. In: Gabbay, D., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Synthese Library, vol 165. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6259-0_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6259-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-009-6261-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6259-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics