Abstract
In one of his most memorable epigrams, Aristotle declares it to be the mark of an educated man to seek in each type of inquiry only as much precision or exactness as the nature of the subject matter allows. This remark, which appears at the beginning of his inquiry into ‘the practical sciences’ (i.e., Ethics and Politics), is designed to forestall the kind of mistakes made by his great predecessor, whom Aristotle criticizes for trying to determine the unity of the polis too precisely. He does not mean to suggest that an educated man should avoid the study of works such as Plato’s Republic; the suggestion is rather that his time would be better spent if he did not attempt to discover scientifically demonstrative arguments in them.
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© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Royce Dove, K. (1984). Hegel’s ‘Deduction of the Concept of Science’. In: Cohen, R.S., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Hegel and the Sciences. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 64. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6233-0_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6233-0_15
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