Abstract
‘At the bar of reason’, says Wisdom in one of his most oft-cited pronouncements, ‘always the final appeal is to cases’ (PD., p.102).1There are two separate emphases in this saying to be distinguished - (A) always the final appeal is to cases, and (B) always the final appeal is tocases. Emphasis (B) is regarded by many as Wisdom ’s distinctive contribution to philosophy. Some views of philosophy view its task as finding the definitions, principles, essences, analyses which are the core of the enterprise of rational reconstuction, of philosophic system- and theory-building. Other views represent the equilibrium between general judgement and particular judgement, in which either one may be sacrificed on the altar of stability. Wisdom in contrast with emphasis (B) is claiming that our judgements about particular cases are the foundation of reason itself.
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References
The works of Wisdom ’s referred to here are:Other Minds, Blackwell, Oxford, 1952, (OM.);
Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, Blackwell, Oxford, 1957, (PPA.)
’Proof and Explanation ’, Virginia, 1957, unpub.;Paradox and Discovery, Blackwell, Oxford, 1965, (PD.);
‘Epistemological Enlightenment’,Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 44, 1970–71, pp.32– 44, (EE.);
‘Appearance and Reality’,Philosophy, 52, 1977, pp. 3–11.
See, for example, Renford Bambrough, ’Principia Metaphysica ’,Philosophy, 39, 1964, pp.97–109, (PM.);
R.W.Newell,The Concept of Philosophy, Methuen, London, 1967
D.C. Yalden-Thomson ‘The Virginia Lectures’, in Renford Bambrough, ed.,Wisdom: Twelve Essays, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, pp. 62–77.
Its fullest realisation in philosophy, albeit a still not wholly explicit one, is in Stanley
Cavell’s The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Scepticism,Morality and Tragedy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, (OR.);
it underlies much of M.O’C.Drury ’s response to Wittgenstein - see hisThe Danger of Words, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973
’Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein ’, in Rush Rhees, ed., Ludwig Wittgenstein:Personal Recollections, Blackwell, Oxford, 1981, pp. 91‘189;
it underlies also G.Kreisel ’s criticisms of Saul Kripke ’s understanding of Wittgenstein - see his review of Kripke ’sWittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Blackwell, Oxford, 1982, in Canadian Philosophical Reviews, 3. 6, December 1982.
Canadian Philosophical Reviews, 3. 6, December 1982.
Renford Bambrough remarks in PM. on the ambitious- ness of his plan in that paper, and excuses himself because of the distance he can see by standing on the shoulders of Wittgenstein and Wisdom. I here have the further inestimable advantage of being able to stand on his shoulders, and can therefore be bold to be ambitious too.
I have made some attempt already in ‘Sense-experience, Colours and Tastes’,Mind, 88, 1979, pp. 161–78;
’Wittgenstein and the Foundations of Knowledge’,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 78, 1977–8, pp. 103–24, (WFK)
‘Foundationalism, Coherentism and Activism’,Philosophical Investigations, 3.3, 1980, pp.33–8.
References to Wittgenstein ’s work are toPhilosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, (PI.);
WittgensteinThe Blue and Brown Books, Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, (B B B.); On Certainty, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, ( OC.).
I believe that as a matter of fact John Wisdom accepts and obeys these methodological observations. However I do not wish to argue for a
connection on historical or biographical grounds. I wish to offer a reading of certain texts, not a description of an author ’s intentions.
Here is a marvellous story told by Wayne Booth, which illustrates how metaphor sets one case by another: ’A lawyer friend of mine was hired to defend a large Southern utility against a suit by a small one, and he thought at first that he was doing fine. All of the law seemed to be on his side, and he felt that he had presented his case well. Then the lawyer for the small utility said, speaking to the jury, almost as if incidentally to his legal case, ‘‘so now we see what it is. They got us where they want us. They are holding us up with one hand, their good sharp fishin’ knife in the other, and they are sayin’, ‘You jes set still, little catfish, we’re jes going to gut ya’H. At that moment, my friend reports, he knew he had lost his case. “I was in the hands of a genius of metaphor1”, from Sheldon Sacks, ed., On Metaphor, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981, p. 50.
The Authority of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, p. 81.
Wittgenstein actually talks about ‘the shift of the bed itself’. He wants to make an anti- Platonic point that grammar can change while nonetheless hanging on to the anti-conventionalist point that grammar is different, special. For the complexities in the river-image, see my ‘Wittgenstein and Heraclitus: Two River-Images’,Philosophy, 49, 1974, pp.191-7 and also WFK pp. 107-21
’Canfield, Cavell and Criteria ’, Dialogue, 22, 1983, pp.262–72.
PD., p. 138. My candidate for saying in one sentence what was Wisdom ’s achievement in philosophy (cf. Renford Bambrough, p.212, this volume) would be that he recorded for us the views of Mr Flood on lions. The two candidates wear the same favours.
Cf. PPA., p.117
This dilemma is based on a dilemma with which Cavell confronts the traditional epistemologist in CR: The traditional investigation of knowledge ■must be the investigation of a concrete claim if its procedure is to be coherent; it cannot be the investigation of a concrete claim if its conclusion is to be general. Without that coherence it would not have the obviousness it has seemed to have; without that generality its conclusion would not be sceptical1 (CR. p.222). I believe that there are deep isomorphisms between the POD and the Generic Object Dilemma, or GOD, as one might call it. Earlier versions of this paper contained sadly incomplete remarks to this effect. See section IX below.
From Epistemology to Romance: Cavell on Scepticism1,Review of Metaphysics, 33, 1980–1, pp. 759–74.
Barry Stroud, ‘Reasonable Claims: Cavell and the Tradition’,Journal of Philosophy, 77, 1980, pp. 731–44; Stroud raises much less gaudily not dissimilar worries.
This text is the fourth version of this paper and is very different from its predecessors. It is still much less clear than I would like and than the dedicatee of this volume deserves. But deadlines, even as forgivingly interpreted as the Editor has interpreted them, are still deadlines. I have got by only with, not a little, but a very great deal of help from my friends. Annette Barnes survived the first version. Renford Bambrough, Graham McFee, Bob Newell and Jenny Teichman offered valuable oral advice on the be that he recorded for us the views of Mr Flood on lions. The two candidates wear the same favours.
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© 1984 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague
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Shiner, R.A. (1984). From Epistemology to Romance via Wisdom. In: Dilman, İ. (eds) Philosophy and Life. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6184-5_14
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