Abstract
Scientific realism can also be supported by arguments which are more indirect but at the same time somewhat more specific and detailed than those discussed in the previous chapter. Thus we can and will below present several methodological (and “inductive”) grounds for the need and usefulness of theoretical concepts. In all, they give good grounds for refuting the so-called theoretician’s dilemma, a dilemma which e.g. Cornman (1975) repeatedly used to defend instrumentalism.
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© 1985 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Tuomela, R. (1985). Methodological Arguments for Scientific Realism. In: Science, Action, and Reality. Episteme, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5446-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5446-5_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8905-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-5446-5
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