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Geographical Dimensions of Energy pp 179–199Cite as

Modeling Imperfect Spatial Energy Markets

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Part of the book series: The GeoJournal Library ((GEJL,volume 5))

Abstract

Coal, electricity, natural gas, and oil markets are imperfect spatial markets. In such markets, consumers, haulers, and/or producers possess market power which derives from the insulation that transport cost provides from competition with distant rivals. Policy analysis tools have been recently developed for simulating such markets. In this chapter, models for predicting prices in imperfect spatial markets are summarized and their application to energy problems is critiqued. It is concluded that much research remains to be done, and that regional scientists, geographers, operations researchers, and economists all must contribute.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Systems Engineering, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, 44106, USA

    Benjamin F. Hobbs

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  1. Benjamin F. Hobbs
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Geology and Geography and Regional Research Institute, West Virginia University, USA

    Frank J. Calzonetti

  2. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., USA

    Frank J. Calzonetti  & Barry D. Solomon  & 

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© 1985 D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Hobbs, B.F. (1985). Modeling Imperfect Spatial Energy Markets. In: Calzonetti, F.J., Solomon, B.D. (eds) Geographical Dimensions of Energy. The GeoJournal Library, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5416-8_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5416-8_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8890-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-5416-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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