Descartes and Merleau-Ponty on the Cogito as the Foundation of Philosophy

Abstract

When one refers to René Descartes’ dualism one usually refers to his metaphysical dualism of mind and body. However, there is also an epistemological dualism which is fundamental to his philosophy. Not only are the mind and body distinct substances, but one can know that one’s body and the rest of the material world exist only after one knows that one exists as a mind or thinking thing. Although Descartes never calls himself a dualist in either of these senses, these expressions accurately describe his view. Maurice Merleau-Ponty rejects Descartes’ epistemological project as a whole and, in particular, rejects the cogito, as understood by Descartes, as the foundation of knowledge. In effect, he denies that what I call “epistemological dualism” is legitimate and questions the conclusions Descartes draws from it.

I am grateful to Alan Donagan, Paul Ricoeur, Daniel Garber, John Bannan, and Thomas Short for their helpful comments on various versions of this paper. When I was a freshman at the University of California at Davis, Marjorie Grene introduced me to the pursuit of wisdom begun in ancient Greece. At least as important, by her example she introduced me to the love of that wisdom. Part of what I learned from her is that the respect we give to philosophers is to continue their pursuit, not by admiring their works as if they were in a museum, but by critically analyzing the questions and answers they offered. I consider myself fortunate to have had the opportunity to have studied with Marjorie Grene and hope that she will forgive me for my interpretation of and views about Descartes, Merleau-Ponty, the cogito, and herself.