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Analytical Action Theory: Breakthroughs and Deadlocks

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Social Action

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLU,volume 43))

Abstract

Action theory has been a certified sub-discipline of analytical philosophy for barely three decades. But many of the specific doctrines, arguments and conundrums which absorb its practitioners originated centuries ago. A familiar example is the Socratic Paradox. In several of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates contends that if you really know that it would be best, on the whole, for you to carry out — or to abstain from — an action of some type at this moment, then you will do so, provided you are able to. Therefore it is altogether impossible that you should ever knowingly and voluntarily act against your better judgment. Aristotle’s response is equally familiar. He thought a Socratic view “plainly contradicts the observed facts”. Don’t we all occasionally have the experience of being quite sure we ought to act some way, yet not even trying, although it is within our power? Aristotle’s own account of the matter is none too satisfactory, however, and the Paradox has continued to trouble philosophers who wish to understand the link between our reasoning about what we should do and our deeds.

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Authors
  1. Irving Thalberg
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Philosophy, The Free University, Berlin, Germany

    Gottfried Seebass

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Finland

    Raimo Tuomela

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© 1985 D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Thalberg, I. (1985). Analytical Action Theory: Breakthroughs and Deadlocks. In: Seebass, G., Tuomela, R. (eds) Social Action. Theory and Decision Library, vol 43. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5263-8_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5263-8_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8824-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-5263-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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