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Plantinga and the Ontological Argument

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Alvin Plantinga

Part of the book series: Profiles ((PROF,volume 5))

Abstract

By following the admirable advice embodied in the above remarks. Alvin Plantinga has produced an original and important study of the ontological argument. Plantinga’s treatment is marked by an intriguing turn — in God and Other Minds [12] he examines a number of variants of the argument and concludes that they arc one and all unsuccessful; but in his more recent The Nature of Necessity [13] and God, Freedom, and Evil [14], Plantinga offers what he takes to be a sound ontological argument. In what follows, I shall survey and evaluate Plantinga on these matters.

None of the attempts to give a general or wholesale refutation of the ontological argument and its variants has succeeded.… There is no substitute, I think, for tackling Anselm’s argument directly and in detail. Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds

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© 1985 D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Tomberlin, J.E. (1985). Plantinga and the Ontological Argument. In: Tomberlin, J.E., van Inwagen, P. (eds) Alvin Plantinga. Profiles, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5223-2_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5223-2_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-2106-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-5223-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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