Abstract
In spite of everything, it is certain that many scientists (as we were able to verify personally during an interview with one of the most distinguished mathematicians of our time) are likely to be shocked when someone tries to demonstrate the strict analogy between the modern system and that of Descartes, an analogy we developed in Chapters 10 and 11. Is this reaction entirely unjustified? Not at all. It stems from the fact that the relativist is aware of the formidable obstacles the theory had to overcome, of the really extraordinary audacity Einstein needed to conceive the paradoxical idea of assimilating inertia and gravitation, of the wealth of ingenuity his mathematical genius had to display in order to achieve this assimilation, starting from the accumulated results of some of the most illustrious mathematicians who had preceded him and then employing dazzling feats of analysis. He knows too what a prodigious number of efforts nineteenth century physicists had to bring into play to unify what used to be called the diverse forces of nature, thus permitting Weyl and Eddington to attempt a geometrical deduction of the whole of physical reality by the reduction of electrical phenomena to space. How could Descartes, no matter how great his mathematical genius, pretend to arrive at an analogous result with only the resources of quite elementary analysis at his disposal?1 Is it not more likely that he gloried in an altogether chimerical accomplishment, that he was, in short, the victim of a pure and simple illusion?
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Notes
Leibniz quite aptly characterizes this dominant trait of Descartes’s effort when he says that Descartes had aspired “to the solution of the most serious questions in a kind of leap” (De primae philosophies emendatione, Opera, ed. Erdmann, Berlin, 1840, p. 122 [Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 708]).
Paul Langevin, ’L’inertie de l’énergie et ses conséquences,’ Journal de physique théorique et appliquée (5th series) 3 (1913) 584.
Sir Ernest Rutherford, ’The Electrical Structure of Matter,’ The Times, 13 Sept. 1923, p. 16, col. 1.
The recent discoveries which, as we are aware, so clearly tend to confirm the concept of the unity of matter, nevertheless seem to some extent to shake the foundations on which Mendeleev built his theory, since the existence of isotopes poses problems for a classification based essentially on atomic weights. Indeed, as Alfred Berthoud says so well, the affirmation that “there exists a relation between the properties of an element and its atomic weight,” which after Mendeleev seemed to be “an undisputable and definitively established principle,” is now found to be “lacking in two respects” for “on the one hand we see the weight of the atom vary without its properties being affected,” and “on the other hand we encounter elements that have the same atomic weight and different properties” (La constitution des atomes, Paris, 1922, p. 31).
[Hermann Lotze, Gründzuge der Naturphilosophie, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1889), p. 26 (quoted in Milič Čapek, Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics, New York: van Nostrand, 1961, p. 95).]
Auguste Comte, CPP 3:152, and Système de politique positive (Paris, 1851 ), 1: 528.
It would be superfluous to cite references in the case of Lavoisier; popular accounts often go so far as to attribute to him the maxim “nothing is created, nothing is lost.” For the law of the conservation of energy, cf., for example, how it is introduced by Henri Poincaré, Thermodynamique (Paris, 1892), p. 65, and La science et l’hypothèse (Paris: Flammarion, s.d.), p. 157 [Science and Hypothesis, trans. W. J. Greenstreet (New York: Dover, 1952), p. 130]; by Gabriel Lippmann, Cours de thermodynamique (Paris, 1889), p. 11 ff.; and by Max Planck, Das Prinzip der Erhaltung der Energie (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 30, 41, 116, 105, 151. Finally, concerning atomism, cf. Marian Smoluchow- ski, ’Anzahl und Grösse der Moleküle und Atome,’ Scientia 13 (1913) 27. For the psychological justification of this attitude, however, cf. below, Ch. 24, §270.
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© 1985 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Meyerson, É. (1985). The Aprioristic Tendency and Experience. In: The Relativistic Deduction. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 83. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5211-9_23
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