Phenomenalism, Relations, and Monadic Representation: Leibniz on Predicate Levels

Abstract

A vexing problem in Leibniz’s philosophy is whether his thesis that bodies are phenomena is compatible with the doctrine that they are aggregates of individual substances. Even in his mature philosophy, Leibniz holds that monads have an organic body in association with them that they dominate.¹ Moreover, the organic body is supposed, in some sense, to be an aggregate of monads, each of which is the dominant monad of another organic body. However the aggregation theory is interpreted, it demands that monads be associated in some fashion with physical bodies — the phenomena represented in inter-monadic representations.² But phenomena are perceived according to a relational network. And each monad can be assigned the position of its respective organic body. However, it must be recognized that there is no well- founded answer to the question where in the relational network a monad is located. For Leibniz is adamant that monads cannot have position as such.³ It is clear that monadic representation, relations, and phenomena are intimately connected in Leibniz’s metaphysics. For example, in his letter to Arnauld of October 9, 1687. Leibniz says “that the soul naturally expresses the whole universe in a particular sense and according to the relation that other bodies have to its own…” He goes on to define the term “expresses”:

… One thing expresses another (in my terminology) when there is a constant and fixed relation between what can be said of the one and of the other. It is thus that a perspectival projection expresses its ground-plan (G. 2. 112).