Abstract
Ockham’s account of the truth conditions for categorical propositions of the forms ‘N is B’ and ‘A is B’ is dictated by his two-fold ontological program: to eliminate universals other than names or concepts and to restrict particular things (res) to the categories of substance and quality.1
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© 1985 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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McCord Adams, M. (1985). Things versus “Hows”, or Ockham on Predication and Ontology. In: Bogen, J., McGuire, J.E. (eds) How Things Are. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 29. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5199-0_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5199-0_7
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