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Heidegger on Art and Art Works pp 110–137Cite as

The Thing and the Work

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Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 99))

Abstract

In § 17 we have seen that Heidegger had reached the point where it became clear that the question concerning the essence of art is to be approached by means of a careful study of the work of art. One of the first things which everyone immediately notices when confronted with works of art is, in Heidegger’s view, that they are things, things not made by nature but by man. Yet most aesthetic theories pass by this aspect of the work of art in silence. One is convinced that even though it is indeed true that art works are things made by man, nonetheless it is true also that what makes them be the beautiful works they are, consists in something else. In other words, most aesthetic theories give some kind of symbolic interpretation of art works and claim that in each work of art there is something else over and above the thingly feature of the art work. It is thus understandable that in these theories one will make a distinction between some material substrate and a form, some material element and some formal element, between sensuous material and some “idea”, or between form and content.

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Notes

  1. FvH, 17; cf. HW, 57(69).

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  2. FvH, 14–19.

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  3. HW, 8–10 (19–20).

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  4. HW, 10–11 (20–22).

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  5. FvH, 21–23.

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  6. HW, 12 (22).

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  7. Cf. An Introduction to Metaphysics, part III, EM, 73–149 (79–164); cf. also all the essays contained in Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, transl. by David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

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  8. Cf. Johannes Lohmann, “M. Heidegger’s Ontological Difference1 and Language”, in On Heidegger and Language, ed. by Joseph J. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 303–363.

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  9. Cf. also Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Ontological Difference, Hermeneutics, and Language”, in On Heidegger and Language, pp. 195–234; WRH, 3–15;

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  10. A. Dondeyne, “La diffé rence ontologique chez M. Heidegger”, in Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 56 (1958), 35–62;

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  11. Alberto Rosales, Transzendenz und Differenz. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der ontologischen Differenz beim frühen Heidegger (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970).

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  12. HW, 14 (24).

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  13. Cf. SZ, § 29 and passim; cf. WP, 35–42 (75–91).

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  14. HW, 12–14 (22–25).

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  15. SZ, §§ 29 and 13; cf. FvH, 33–35.

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  16. HW, 15 (26).

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  17. GP, §§ 8 and 9; cf. FvH, 43–45.

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  18. HW, 14–16 (25–26).

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  19. HW, 16–17 (26–28); cf. FvH, 44–47.

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  20. SZ, §§ 15–18.

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  21. SZ, 65–66 (94–95).

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  22. SZ, 68–69 (97–98).

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  23. SZ, 69 (98).

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  24. SZ, 69–72 (99–102); for the preceding see also William J. Richardson, “Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology to the Thinking of Being”, in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. by Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing Co., 1981), pp. 79–93.

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  25. SZ, 72–73 (102–103).

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  26. SZ, 73–74 (103–104).

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  27. SZ, 74–76 (104–107).

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  28. HW, 17–18 (28).

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  29. HW, 18 (28).

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  30. HW, 18 (28–29).

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  31. HW, 18 (29).

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  32. HW, 18–19 (29–30).

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  33. HW, 19 (30). Cf. “Vom Wesen und Begriff der Phusis. Aristoteles, Physik B, 1”, in W, 237–299; “On the Being and Conception of Phusis in Aristotle’s Physics B, 1”, English translation by Thomas J. Sheehan, in Man and World, 9 (1976), 219–270.

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  34. HW, 19–20 (30).

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  35. FvH, 57–58.

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  36. HW, 20 (31).

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  37. HW, 20–22 (30–32). Cf. FvH, 57–64.

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  38. Cf. GP, § 5; SZ, § 7.

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  39. SZ, § 45.

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  40. SZ, § 63.

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  41. HW, 20; cf. FvH, 60–62.

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  42. FvH, 62–64.

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  43. HW, 21–22 (32).

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  44. FvH, 65–66.

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  45. HW, 22 (32–33).

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  46. Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, ed. by Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979), pp. 63–99.

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  47. HW, 22(33).

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  48. FvH, 68–71.

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  49. HW, 22–23 (33–34).

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  50. Meyer Schapiro, “The Still Life as a Personal Object — A Note on Heidegger and van Gogh”, in The Reach of Mind, ed. by M.L. Simmel (New York: Springer, 1968), 203–209, p. 205.

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  51. Ibid., p. 206.

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  52. HW, 65 (78). Cf. Schapiro, loc. cit., p. 206.

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  53. Ibid.

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  54. Cf. Jan Hulsker, The Complete van Gogh (New York: Abrams, 1980), Nos. 1569, and 1364, respectively.

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  55. Cf. Jacques Derrida, La vérité en peinture (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), 291–436, pp. 375–379, 418–421.

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  56. Derrida, op. cit., p. 325.

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  57. Ibid., pp. 353–367.

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  58. Ibid., pp. 367–375.

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  59. HW, 24 (35).

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  60. HW, 25 (36).

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  61. Cf. Derrida, loc. cit., p. 327.

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  62. HW, 17 (27).

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  63. HW, 20 (31). Cf. Derrida, loc. cit., pp. 336–338.

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  64. Derrida, loc. cit., pp. 338–343.

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  65. HW, 23 (34).

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  66. FvH, 71–72.

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  67. SZ, § 29.

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  68. FvH, 72–78.

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  69. Cf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Alcune Riflessioni Sulla Concezione Della Terra In Heidegger”, in Humanitas, 4 (1978), 445–468.

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  70. FvH, 78–82.

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  71. HW, 23–24 (34–35).

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  72. FvH, 82–85.

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  73. SZ, §§ 35–38, 68.

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  74. FvH, 85–90.

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  75. HW, 24–27 (35–38). Cf. WBH, 95–96. — To describe the relationship between work and truth Heidegger sometimes uses the expression “(sich) ins Werk setzen”, “to establish (itself) in the work”. The German expression is often incorrectly translated as “to set (itself) to work”. Note that “ins Werk setzen” is one of the synonyms of the verb schicken which is related to Schickung and Geschick (to send, destiny, sending, mittence); other synonyms of schicken are einrichten and ordnen, expressions which Heidegger also uses to express the relation between work and truth. Cf. HW, 49 (61). In the Addendum Heidegger states that “setzen” must be taken in the sense of the Greek thesis (setting, placing) and not in the modern sense of positing. Cf. UK, 71 (82–83). In view of the fact that the verbs “setzen” and “to set” are etymologically closely related, I often use the expression “to set (itself) into the work” for “(sich) ins Werk setzen”. Note that both “setzen” and “to set” mean to cause something to be in a place or position that is allotted to it, to put it in a place that is adapted to receive it. Heidegger says several times that the expression “(sich) ins Werk setzen” is ambiguous; it seems to me that this ambiguity is best preserved in English if the expression is translated as “setting (itself) into the work”. Cf. UK, 74 (86–87).

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  76. FvH, 91–100.

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  77. Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (Reclam), 73–74 (86).

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  78. Hw, 27–28 (38–39).

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Authors
  1. Joseph J. Kockelmans
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© 1985 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

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Kockelmans, J.J. (1985). The Thing and the Work. In: Heidegger on Art and Art Works. Phaenomenologica, vol 99. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5067-2_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5067-2_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-247-3144-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-5067-2

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