Abstract
Two sorts of questions have been raised in recent literature about the concept of intentionality in phenomenology. Some have asked, whether Husserlian intentionality can be anything but de re and have wondered what account of de dicto intentionality it is possible for Husserl to give.1 Others have started by recognising that on the Frege-Husserl theory intentional reference is necessarily mediated by an abstract entity called the Sinn or noema and have drawn the conclusion that for such a theory all intentionality must be de dicto.2 What account then, it is asked, can Husserl give of de re intentionality? The very fact that there are two such opposed readings of the situation gives rise to the suspicion that there must be something wrong either in the way the de re — de dicto distinction is drawn or in the understanding of Husserl’s concept of intentionality or in both. This alone justifies an attempt to begin anew.
Appeared in Research in Phenomenology XII (1982). Reprinted by permission of Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.
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Notes
J. Hintikka asks this question in his The Intentions of Intentionality (Boston: Reidel, 1975).
Chisholm has emphasised this distinction in “The Logic of Believing,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly LXI (1980), pp. 31–49.
J. Hintikka, The Intentions of Intentionality, D.W. Smith and R. McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning and Language, Synthese Library, Vol. 154 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982).
J.N. Mohanty, “Intentionality and Noema,” (this volume, Essay 2) (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982).;
Izchak Miller, “Husserl’s Account of our Temporal Awareness,” in: H. Dreyfus (Ed.), Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982).;
D.W. Smith and R. McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982).
Cf. Mohanty, “Intentionality and ‘Possible Worlds,’” (this volume, Essay 3).
Cf. R. Howell, “Intuition, Synthesis and Individuation in the Critique of Pure Reason,” Nous 7 (1973), pp. 207–232,
M. Thompson, “Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant’s Epistemology,” Review of Metaphysics 26 (1972), pp. 314–343.
H. Dreyfus (Ed.), Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science.
R. Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art. Edited and translated by George G. Grabowicz (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
D. Ackerman, “De Re Propositional Attitudes Towards Integers,” in R.W. Shahan and C. Swoyer (Eds.), Essays on the Philosophy of W.V. Quine (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), pp. 145–153;
C. Swoyer, “Belief and Predication,” Nous 15 (1983), pp. 197–220.
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Mohanty, J.N. (1985). Husserlian Phenomenology and the De Re and De Dicto Intentionalities. In: The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy. Phaenomenologica, vol 98. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5049-8_4
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