Abstract
It has often been supposed that probability can be used to throw light on epistemology and the structure of epistemic justification. For reasons I will not pursue here, I do not think that can work. But I do think that the converse can work. That is, by appealing to a fairly sophisticated epistemology proceeding in terms of prima facie reasons and defeaters, one can make sense of objective probability concepts. The details of this are presented in a number of recent articles, and will be presented in full in a future book. My purpose here is to give a brief sketch of the theory of nomic probability.(See “Notes” at end of paper.)
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© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Pollock, J.L. (1987). Sketch of the Theory of Nomic Probability. In: MacNeill, I.B., Umphrey, G.J., Safiul Haq, M., Harper, W.L., Provost, S.B. (eds) Advances in the Statistical Sciences: Foundations of Statistical Inference. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4788-7_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4788-7_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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