Abstract
It is a widely shared basic assumption that science can (and usually does) show cognitive progress, in the sense that ever better explanations of or theories about natural phenomena are being produced. Exceptions taken apart, philosophers of science assume in addition that there are general criteria specifying when a given scientific development is cognitively progressive, or successful, and when not,1 and they have generally seen as one of their tasks to make these criteria explicit.
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Zandvoort, H. (1986). Research Programmes and Criteria for Cognitive Success: Some Views from Recent Philosophy of Science. In: Models of Scientific Development and the Case of Nuclear Magnetic Resonance. Synthese Library, vol 184. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4764-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4764-1_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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