The Metaphysical Foundations of Newtonian Science

Abstract

The science for which Kant aims to provide “metaphysical foundations” in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (abbreviated as MAN)¹ is Newtonian science: in particular, the science of Newton’s Principia (1686). This is indicated by the many explicit references to Newton and the Principia scattered throughout MAN, and, more importantly, by its content—which centrally involves both Newton’s Laws of Motion (especially in chapter 3: the Mechanics) and the theory of Universal Gravitation (especially in Propositions 5–8 and the General Observation to chapter 2: the Dynamics). Moreover, it is quite clear that Newton’s Principia serves as a model—perhaps the model—for scientific achievement during the whole of Kant’s long career: from the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755) to the unpublished Opus postumum (1796–1803). Thus, whether or not one wishes to extract philosophical morals from MAN that transcend the specific content of Newton’s Principia, there can be no doubt at all that this work is at least paradigmatic for Kant.

Ideas for this paper were developed initially in seminars presented at the University of Western Ontario, Spring 1984, under a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Visiting Foreign Scholars Fellowship. I am indebted to the questions, comments, and encouragement of Robert Butts, William Harper, and Kathleen Okruhlik. I am also indebted to helpful comments from Manley Thompson and Roberto Torretti on previous drafts. Further, although I have fundamental disagreements with his approach, I am indebted throughout to the writings of Gerd Buchdahl. I am most especially indebted, however, to the writings, suggestions, and criticisms of Howard Stein.