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The Methodology of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics

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The Rational as Reasonable

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 4))

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Abstract

The problematics of interpretation may enter the question in two types of situations in legal research praxis. I shall call these a law text centered research strategy and a problem centered research strategy.1

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Notes

  1. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 49 ff. Aleksander Peczenik has pointed out to me that the distinction between text-oriented and problem-oriented viewpoints only concerns the so-called context of discovery. With the reservations made in the text, this holds true. Worth mentioning is, however, that the research strategy may be slight ly different depending on from which “end” one takes his starting point.

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  2. Regarding the concept of norm propositions see Niiniluoto, Beiheft 3, p. 172, Wróblewski, ‘Verification and Justification in the Legal Sciences’, pp. 196 ff. and esp. gp. 201 ff., and Sintonen, Matti, Problems of Interpretation and Truth in Legal Science, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 2, pp. 77 ff. See also Klami, Finalistinen oikeusteoria, pp. 19 ff. See also Aarnio, Alexy, and Peczenik, Rechtstheorie 1982, pp. 427 ff.

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  3. Niiniluoto, ‘Truth and Legal Norms’, In: Conditions of Validity and Cognition in Modern Legal Thought, ARSP, Beiheft 25 (1985), pp. 168 ff. and especially pp. 182 ff.

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  4. See von Wright, G. H., Ts and Ought’, In: Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life, 1985, pp. 263 ff. especially p. 272.

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  5. In connection with the conceptual relation between the norm standpoint and the norm recommendation, R. M. Hare’s distinction between the frastic and neustic parts of a sentence is interesting. According to Hare, the neustic component shows whether it is a question of an indicative or imperative use of language. In a corresponding manner the persuasive component has a role to play in norm recommendations. See Hare, Language of Morals, pp. 15 ff. and esp. p. 18.

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  6. Regarding definitions in general, see Niiniluoto, Johdatus tieteenfilosofiaan, p. 160. See also Koch, Hans-Joachim and Rüssman Helmut, Juristische Begründslehre, pp. 147 ff. and pp. 280 ff. and Klug, Ulrich, Juristische Logik, 3rd ed., pp. 87 ff. Especially in regard to the analytical nature of interpretative statements, see Niiniluoto, ‘Language, Norms and Truth’, p. 177 ff.

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  7. Aarnio, On Legal Reasoning, p. 59 ss.

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  8. Cr. also Klami, Finalistinen oikeusteoria, p. 62. and Peschka, Vilmos, Die Theorie der Rechtsnormen, pp. 44 ff.

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  9. Hart, op. cit., pp. 77 ff., MacCormick, Neil, op. cit., p. 229 and Ross, Directives and Norms, p. 91.

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  10. Ross, op. cit., pp. 84 ff: “a set of secondary rules is required to specify what sanctions may be exacted of those who violate the substantive law… Such rules are directed to the judge…”

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  11. In this connection Kelsen uses the term, “Zurechnung”. See Reine Rechtslehre, p. 22. About the relation between “Is” and “Ought”: von Wright, G. H., Is and Ought. Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life. pp. 263 ff. and Weinberger, Ota, ‘“Is” and “Ought” Reconsidered’, ARSP 1984, p. 454 ff.

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  12. Alchourron, Carlos and E. Bulygin, Normative Systems, p. 41 ff.

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  13. Cf. Dworkin, Ronald, ‘The Model of Rules’, In: Taking Rights Seriously, sections 1–4.

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  14. Searle, J. R., op. cit., pp. 56 ff. and Ross, Directives and Norms, p. 53. — A good analysis is presented by Riccardo Guastini in: ‘Six Concepts of “Constitutive Rule”’, p. 488 ff. and also Tuori, K., Oikeusnormien asettamismenettelyt ja oikeuden, Kriisitendenssit, Politiiikka 3 (1985), pp. 189 ff.

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  15. Regarding competence norms, see Ross, op. cit., pp. 130 ff. and Zitting, Simo, ‘Omistajan oikeuksista ja velvollisuuksista F, LM 1952, pp. 394 ff.

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  16. Regarding this, see Aarnio, Perillisen oikeusasemasta, p. 71 ff. 17Makkonen, Zur Problematik der juristischen Entscheidung, pp. 27 ff.

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  17. For general comments on this, see Weinberger, Christiane and Ota, Logik, Semantik und Hermeneutik, pp. 64 ff. and pp. 96 ff. See also Esser, Josef, Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung, passim, and Jonsson, Inge, ‘Riktningar inom 1800-talets hermeneutik’, pp. 65 ff. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 150 ff. and Aarnio, ‘Outline of a Hermeneutic Approach in Legal Theory’, In: Philosophical Perspectives, pp. 47 ff. Cf. Villa, Vittorio, ‘Legal Science and Hermeneutic Point of View’, pp. 509 ff., and in general Villa, Teorie della Scienza Giuridica e Teorie delle Scienze Naturali, passim. Stig Strömholm emphasizes the general differences between linguistic interpretation and the legal interpretation of texts. He particularly points to four aspects: (a) legal interpretation has a broader and more relevant connection to the social context than do other forms of interpretation, (b) there is an hierarchial division of roles among the interpreters, (c) legal interpretation must fulfill certain axiological goals such as justice, and (d) the focus of interpretation, legal norms, form a system. Cf. Strömholm, ‘Juridisk tolkningsmetodik före 1800-talets “moderna genombrott”’, pp. 47 ff.

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  18. This is especially the case in classical text hermeneutics, Cf. Aarnio, ‘Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence’, pp. 56 ff. Hans-Georg Hinderung gives a good analysis of the problem in Rechtsnorm und Verstehen, passim. See also Larenz, Karl, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, p. 85 ff.

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  19. Cf. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 154–155. The philosophical problematics of “conventions” is dealt with in a very interesting manner in Lars Hertz-berg’s paper, ‘Science and Certainty’, pp. 60 ff. especially pp. 72 ff.

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  20. See about these types of sentences p. ff.

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  21. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 75 ff.

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  22. Cf. Aarnio, op. cit., p. 90.

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  23. Cf. Aarnio, op. cit., p. 122.

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  24. Regarding sources of law, see Peczenik, Juridikens metodproblem, pp. 109 ff. and Strömholm, op. cit., pp. 287 ff. and Ross, On Law and Justice, pp. 82 ff. See also Makkonen, Kaarle (ed.), Oikeudellinen lähdemateriaali, 1979, pp. 16 ff.

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  25. See e.g. Björne, Lars, Deutsche Rechtssysteme im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, especially p. 131 ff. where one can find a really remarkable analysis about the historical development of the so-called systematic, thinking in legal science.

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  26. Alanen, Aatos, Yleinen oikeustiede ja kansainvälinen yksityisoikeus, 1965, p. 56 and Peczenik, Juridikens metodproblem, pp. 136–137. About the customary law in general: Klami, Hannu Tapani, Gewohnheitsrecht als Rechtsquelle, pp. 4 ff. and pp. 44 ff.

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  27. Brusiin, op. cit., pp. 7 ff. and Alanen, op. cit., p. 57. See also Strömholm, op. cit., pp. 187 ff.

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  28. Alanen, op. cit., pp. 58 ff.

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  29. Makkonen, Zur Problematik der juridischen Entscheidung, p. 65.

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  30. Alanen, op. cit., p. 60.

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  31. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 135 ff. Regarding precedent in general, see Brusiin, op. cit., pp. 167 ff. Peczenik, op. cit., pp. 104 ff., Strömholm, op. cit., pp. 333 ff. Regarding the position of precedents in American law, see Radin, Max, ‘Case Law and Stare Decisis’, pp. 3 ff. An excellent analysis can be found in: Saarenpää, Ahti E., ‘Court Decisions as the Focus of Study’, SSL 1984, pp. 123 ff.

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  32. On the distinction Aarnio, A., Oikeussāānnōten tulleinnasta, pp. 89 ff.

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  33. See, however, the Supreme Court decision KKO 2649/19.10.1966 and Miettinen, M in Minutes of the XXI Annual Meeting of the Lawyers Union in Finland, 1970, pp. 80 ff.

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  34. The Royal Letter to the Court of Appeal in Gōta 1682 and Nehrman, D., Inledning til then swenska jurisprudentiam civilem, 1729, p. 72.

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  35. Brusiin, op. cit., pp. 157 ff. and Makkonen, Zur Problematik der juridischen Entscheidung, pp. 153 ff. See also Jørgensen, Stig, Law and Society, pp. 110 ff. For comments on the relationship between general principles of law and juridical induction, see Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 201 ff.

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  36. Perelman, Chaim, Juristische Logik als Argumentationslehre, p. 109.

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  37. Aarnio, ‘Eternal and Changing Law’, In: Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence, p. 100 ff. In this connection, the criticisms that Dworkin directs at Hart’s views of legal principles is interesting. What is important is what turns principles into legal principles. Cf. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 36 ff.

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  38. Regarding this criticism, see Aarnio, ‘The Development of Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law in Finland’, pp. 9 ff. See also Aarnio, ‘150 anni di filosofia del diretto in Finlandia’, pp. 809 ff.

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  39. Aarnio, The Development of Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law in Finland, pp. 20 ff.

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  40. As far as the goal reasoning according to the pragmatic instrumentalism is concerned one can find an excellent analysis in: Summers, Robert S., Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory, pp. 60 ff. Regarding the consideration of consequences in general, see MacCormick, op. cit., pp. 100 ff. See also Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 84 ff, which deals with interpretation presented in the form of so-called technical norms, Klami, Finalistinen oikeusteoria, pp. 42 ff. and Peczenik, Juridikens metodproblem, p. 150 ff. Peczenik presents the so-called ideological interpretation method in general.

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  41. Perelman, op. cit., p. 79 and p. 109.

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  42. Perelman, op. cit., p. 43 and Germann, O. A., Methodische Grundfragen, pp. 4 ff. See also Rahlf, Joachim, ‘Die Rolle der historischen Auslegungsmethode in der Rechtsprechung des BGH’, pp. 27 ff. In Scandinavian realism, criticism of the will of the legislator has been presented especially by Karl Olivecrona, Cf. e.g. Law as Fact, pp. 65 ff.

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  43. See Note 21 of Part III.

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  44. Aarnio, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 3, pp. 51–53.

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  45. Also on the basis of this doctrine four sources of law rise over all others: written law, travaux préparatoires, court decisions and customary law. See also Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 133 ff.

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  46. Peczenik, op. cit., pp. 48 ff., Peczenik, ‘The Structure of a Legal System’, Rechtstheorie 6 (1975), p. 7 ff. and Peczenik, Rechtstheorie 2 (1980), pp. 150 ff. Cf. H. L. A. Hart’s concepts “permissive” and “mandatory”, The Concept of Law, p. 246 ff.

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  47. For a more detailed analysis of this, see Summers, Robert S., The Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common Law Justification’, pp. 724 ff. (Also available in ARSP, Beiheft 11). See also Summers, Robert S. and Leigh B. Kelley, ‘“Economist Reasons” for Common Law Decisions — A Preliminary Inquiry’, pp. 213 ff. Cf Golding, Martin P., Legal Reasoning, pp. 39 ff.

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  48. Summers, op. cit., pp. 726 ff.

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  49. Summers, op. cit., pp. 728 ff.

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  50. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 25 and 44. Regarding these comments, see Alexy, Robert, ‘Zum Begriff des Rechtsprincips’, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 1, 1979, pp. 59 ff., esp. pp. 63 ff. See also Eckhoff and Sundby, Rettssysterner: Systemteoretisk innfring i rettsfilosofin, 1976, pp. 128 ff. Regarding this, see Jareborg, Nils, ‘Regler och riktlinjer’, TfR 1979, pp. 385 ff. With the reservations made, the text corresponds to Jareborg’s view of the matter. Cf., however, Eckhoff, TfR 1980, p. 145. Regarding the term “guiding standard”, see Eckhoff, ‘Guiding Standards in Legal Reasoning’, p. 205 ff.

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  51. Regarding Wittgenstein’s concept of rules, see Philosophical Investigations, § 218–219. In this, Wittgenstein emphasizes that following a rule is similar to “following blind”. There is no choice in the matter. Rules are like the tracks of a railroad: “and infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule (§ 218). Henry Le Roy Finch observes, on the other hand, that we have no obligation to follow a rule (op. cit., p. 197). A rule compels us only if we begin to follow it. In this sense, it is a question of an “either-or” situation. See also Brand, Gerd, The Central Texts of Wittgenstein, pp. 125 ff. An excellent analysis about the Wittgensteinian concept of rule, Kripke, Saul A.: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, esp. pp. 7 ff.

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  52. Peczenik, Juridikens metodproblem, p. 86 and concerning the standards of preference pp. 118–120.

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  53. Regarding analogy in general, see Frändberg, Ake, Om analog användning av rättsnormer, pp. 16 ff., Koch and Rüssman, op. cit., pp. 259 ff. and especially Peczenik, op. cit., pp. 74 ff. See also Aarnio, On Legal Reasoning, pp. 70 ff. and Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, pp. 343 ff. About case-analogy Golding, Martin P., Legal Reasoning, pp. 44 ff. and pp. 97 ff.

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  54. Peczenik, op.cit., p. 76.

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  55. Ibid., p. 74.

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  56. Koch and Rüssman, op. cit., pp. 257 ff. and Klug, op. cit., pp. 132 ff.

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  57. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, p. 130.

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  58. Aarnio, On Legal Reasoning, p. 72.

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  59. Alanen, op. cit., p. 159.

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  60. See e.g. Larenz, Karl, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 255 ff., Engisch, K.

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  61. Einführung in das juristische Denken, p. 256 and Zippelius, Reinhold, Rechtsphilosophie, pp. 221 ff.

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  62. Regarding isomorphic situations, see Stenius, Erik, ‘Wittgensteinin “puhtaan kielen kritiikki”‘, p. 45 ff.

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  63. In general, see Alexy, op.cit., p. 342, Klug, op. cit., p. 128 and Koch and Rüssman, op. cit., p. 258. Cf. Golding, M. P., ‘Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court’, pp. 208 ff.

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  64. Alanen, op. cit., p. 159.

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  65. Allowing extending analogy in criminal law will lead to a conflict with the principle of nulla poena sine lege. On the other hand, a complete prohibition on analogy will lead to an unevenness of application, as similar cases cannot be dealt with in a similar fashion. For this reason, in the Finnish literature, it has been usual to warn only against analogy in malam partem. Cf. Honkasalo, Brynolf, ‘Suomen rikosoikeus’, Yleiset opit I, p. 50. See also Peczenik, op. cit., pp. 89–90.

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  66. Peczenik, op. cit., p. 85.

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  67. Alanen, op. cit., p. 161.

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  68. Ibid.

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  69. Peczenik, op. cit. p. 76. See about the methods of legal interpretation in general Bydlinski, F., Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff, pp. 437 ff., Larenz, Karl, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 188 ff. See also Vernengo, Roberto J., Curso de Teoria General del Derecho, pp. 411 ff.

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  70. Alanen, op. cit., p. 159.

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  71. Alexy, op. cit., p. 319.

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  72. Regarding these concepts see Victor, Dag, Rättssystem och vetenskap, 1977, pp. 21 ff.

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  73. Ibid., pp. 25 ff.

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  74. Ibid., pp. 27–28.

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  75. Regarding the so-called “intertwinement thesis”, see Aarnio, The Significance of the Theoretical Element in Legal Research, In: Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence, pp. 120 ff.

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  76. It is a question of subsumption. See e.g. Koch and Rüssmann, pp. 64 ff. Cf. Larenz, op. cit., p. 256 and Alexy, op. cit., pp. 274 ff.

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  77. See, in general, Ahmavaara, Yrjö, Informaatio, p. 112. The expression used as an example, “someone”, is an unspecified singular term. See Jareborg, Nils, Begrepp och brottsbeskrivning, p. 94. To supplement the text, see Chapter 4 of Jareborg’s book, p. 93 ff. See also Hart, op. cit., p. 4, pp. 15 ff. and pp. 122 ff., Vernengo, Roberto, J., Curso de Teoria General del Derecho, pp. 406 ff. and Wróblewski, Jerzy, ‘Fuzziness of Legal System’, pp. 311 ff.

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  78. In this connection there is reason to recall Wittgenstein s characterization of the concept of “family resemblance”. It is precisely in connection with open terms that we can say that individual meaning contents are “related” to each other only in the sense that the strands of a rope form the rope. See Philosophical Investigations, § 66–75. The problem of open terms has been dealt with in a noteworthy manner by Furberg Mats, in Saying and Meaning, pp. 72 ff. See also Hart, op. cit., pp. 121 ff, which touches upon the problem of the so-called “open texture”.

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  79. Regarding this concept, see e.g. Regnell, Hans, Semantik, p. 69 and Ross, op. cit., pp. 135 ff. See also Ekelöf, Per Olof, Semantik och juridik. Svensk Juristtidning 1966, pp. 497 ff. and Jareborg, op. cit., pp. 98 ff.

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  80. Aarnio, ‘Formal Incorrectness and the Invalidity of Legal Acts’, SSL, pp. 19 ff.

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  81. Ahmavaara, op. cit., p. 112 and Jareborg, op. cit., p. 108. See also Regnell, op. cit., pp. 75 ff.

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  82. Jareborg, op. cit., pp. 121 ff.

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  83. Ibid., p. 108. When the same term refers to several different matters, the concept of “polysemia” has often been used.

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  84. See von Wright, G. H., ‘Normit ja logiikka’, Ajatus 1963, pp. 255 ff.

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  85. Regarding the concept of the legislator, see Peczenik, Juridikens metodproblem, pp. 112–113.

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  86. See Brusiin, op. cit., pp. 24 ff., Coing, Helmut, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, pp. 328 ff., Makkonen, Zur Problematik der juridischen Entscheidung, pp. 122 ff. and Peczenik, op. cit., pp. 76 ff.

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  87. A rather complete definition of the concept of the gap is given by Alchourrón and Bulygin. See Normative Systems, pp. 145 ff. and the comments on this in Aarnio, On Legal Reasoning, pp. 60 ff.

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  88. See also Wróblewski, Jerzy, ‘System of Norms and Legal System’, Rivista Internationale di Filosofia del Diritto 2 (1972).

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  89. Alchourrón and Bulygin, op. cit., p. 146.

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  90. Ibid., p. 147.

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  91. Kelsen, Hans, Reine Rechtslehre, p. 348 ff.

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  92. Alchourrón and Bulygin, op. cit., p. 51 ff.

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  93. Ibid., p. 146; cf. pp. 31 ff. and pp. 106 ff.

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  94. Peczenik, op. cit., p. 77.

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  95. From the general point of view it is a question of a more precise outlining of the meaning content of the expression in question. Regarding this concept, see Naess, Arne, Empirisk semantik, pp. 6–13 and pp. 26 ff. and Naess, Arne, Interpretation and Preciseness, p. 350 ff.

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  96. See Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 120–121. The basis of the diagram is Naess’ presentation of pro-and counter-argumentation. See Empirisk semantik, pp. 67 ff. Ilmar Tammelo has called this type of reasoning “a zetetic process”. See Tammelo, Zetetischer Verfahren für juristisches Aufweisen; Rechtstheorie 1978, pp. 421 ff. For comments on this see Wimmer, Franz, ‘Überlegungen zu Tammelos Unterscheidung von Euduktion, Produktion und Seduktion,’ Rechtstheorie 1979, pp. 338 ff.

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  97. Peczenik, The Basis of Legal Justification, pp. 33 ff. Peczenik makes, on good grounds, a distinction between the contextually sufficient and the deep justification. See also op. cit., pp. 1 ff., 28 ff, and 110 ff.

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  98. See Alexy, op. cit., pp. 272 ff and Wróblewski, ‘Legal Syllogism and Rationality of Judicial Decision’, ‘Rechtstheorie 5 (1974), pp. 39 ff., Wróblewski, ‘Legal Decision and Its Justification’, Proceedings of the World Congress for Legal and Social Philosophy. 1971, pp. 412 ff. and Wróblewski, ‘Justification of Legal Decisions’, Revue Internationale de Philosophic La Nouvelle Rhétorique. Essais en hommage à Chaim Perelman 127–128 (1979), pp. 277 ff.

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  99. A more extensive analysis of syllogistic deduction is to be found in Tammelo, Ilmar and Helmut Schreiner, Grundzüge und Grundverfahren der Rechtslogik. I., pp. 110 ff. See also Aarnio, On Legal Reasoning, pp. 59–60, Koch- Rüssmann, op. cit., pp. 14 ff. and pp. 59 ff. and Makkonen, op. cit., pp. 47 ff. Regarding deductive reasoning, very clear criticism is to be found in MacCormick, op. cit., pp. 19 ff.

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  100. See MacCormick, op. cit., pp. 19–52 and esp. pp. 100 ff., which separates “second-order justification” from the deductive reasoning in a decision. This latter justification corresponds to the term, “external justification”.

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  101. The description of Ex-justification is, in this section, based on the discussions and common work that the author has had with Aleksander Peczenik in 1984–85. See also Peczenik, Creativity and Transformations in Legal Reasoning, pp. 280 ff.

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  102. Aarnio, Perillisen oikeusasemasta, pp. 362 ff.

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  103. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 133 ff.

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  104. Alexy, op. cit., pp. 221 ff.

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  105. Larenz, op. cit., pp. 198 ff.

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  106. Regarding these principles, see Ross, op. cit., pp. 164 ff. and Peczenik, op. cit., pp. 110 ff and Strömholm, op. cit., pp. 428 ff.

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  107. See Kommentar zum Allgemeinen Gesetzbuch (hrsg. von Heinrich Klang und Franz Gschnitzer), p. 103 and p. 107. Regarding the significance of travaux préparatoires in general. See Strömholm, Legislative Material and Constitution of Statutes. SSL 1966, pp. 175 ff. and Rahlf, op. cit., pp. 28 ff.

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  108. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 134 ff. and Aarnio, On Legal Reasoning, pp. 109 ff.

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  109. Aarnio, On Legal Reasoning, pp. 216 ff.

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  110. Cf. Peczenik, op. cit., p. 113, where he states that lawyers know whose intention is to be taken into consideration. Peczenik’s view would seem to oversimplify the situation, as research praxis has shown countless examples where different decisions on the same matter have made use of the disparate views of various instances.

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  111. Larenz, Karl, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, p. 322. Larenz uses a concept of an “objective-teleological” argument. This concept refers to the objective goal involved in legal order.

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  112. See e.g. Strömholm, Rätt, rättskällor och rättstillämpning, p. 405

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  113. Perelman, op. cit., p. 79.

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  114. Peczenick, op. cit., p. 191. It is this that is referred to in the text as the “objective” meaning (interpretation).

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  115. Klang and Gschnitzer, op. cit., p. 104. See also Zippelius, Reinhold, Rechtsphilosophie 1982, pp. 199 ff.

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  116. Regarding this, see Alexy, op. cit., pp. 322 ff., who distinguishes between systemic interpretation in a strict and in a broad sense. The former (“systematische Überprüfung im engeren Sinne”) is connected with the logical consistency between the statement being interpreted and the statements used to support it. The latter (“systematische Überprüfung im weiteren Sinne”) can be characterized by speaking of the practical consistency between statements. Alexy calls the former “logical control of consistency” and the latter “practical control of consistency” (“Konsistenz-kontrolle”). Regarding systemic points of view in interpretation in general, see Peczenik, op. cit., pp. 99 ff. and Strömholm, op. cit. pp. 401 ff. In Finnish legal science, Saarenpää has been the most consistent in emphasizing systemic points of view. See Tasajaon periaate, pp. 18 ff, and Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 121 ff.

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  117. Regarding this problem, see Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, p. 137.

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  118. Cf. Alexy, who presents an interesting analysis of the significance of legal dogmatical statements in justification. He summarizes his analysis in the form of a rationality principle: “If a dogmatic argument is possible, it must be used”. See Alexy, op. cit., pp. 320 ff., and esp. p. 334. In other words a rational interpreter refers to a legal dogmatical opinion, too. At the same time, Alexy regards legal dogmatics as having several functions, such as the stabilization function, the technical task of furthering the learning and teaching of legal material and the heuristic function, in other words the task of presenting decision models with practical applications. See Alexy, op. cit., pp. 326–332.

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  119. Aarnio, On Legal Reasoning, pp. 183 ff.

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  120. Regarding the so-called finalistic interpretation in general, see MacCormick op. cit., pp. 129 ff. See also Alexy, op. cit., pp. 295 ff., who deals with the problematics of so-called teleological interpretation, Larenz, op. cit., p. 322 and Peczenik, op. cit., pp. 150 ff.

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  121. Klami, Legal Heuristics, esp. pp. 21–36.

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  122. Cf. Klami, Finalistinen oikeusteoria, p. 62, cf. pp. 128–129 and p. 133.

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  123. See Peczenik, Juridikens metodproblem, p. 191. Cf. Walter, Robert, ‘Das Auslegungsproblem im Leichte der Reinen Rechtslehre’, p. 194 ff.

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  124. Alchourrón and Bulygin, Normative Systems, pp. 21 ff.

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  125. Brusiin, op. cit., p. 195. See also Alchourrón and Bulygin, op. cit., p. 53 and Krawietz, op. cit., p. 88 and p. 153.

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  126. Brusiin’s position on the matter is not quite clear, as on the other hand he believes that all legal interpretation “arises” from the reality of societal norms. Even so, for Brusiin “order” is a volitive concept, “system” a cognitive concept. An interesting analysis about the concept of legal system is presented in: Kerimov, D. A., Philosophische Probleme des Rechts, pp. 199 ff. especially p. 202 ff.

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  127. Alchourrón and Bulygin, op. cit., pp. 50 ff.

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  128. Alchourrón, Carlos, ‘Systematization and Change in the Science of Law’, Proceedings of the XI World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 1983 (in print), Bulygin, Eugenio, ‘Legal Dogmatics and the Systematization of Law’, in: op. cit. and Aarnio, Aulis, ‘On the Change of Legal System’, in: op. cit.

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  129. Alchourrón and Bulygin, op. cit., pp. 9 ff.

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  130. Ibid., pp. 54–55.

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  131. Ibid., pp. 72 ff.

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  132. Ibid., pp. 78 ff.

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  133. Kuhn, op. cit., Chapt. 3 and e.g. Chapt. 9.

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  134. See Ross, On Law and Justice, pp. 211 ff. and Zitting, Simo, An Attempt to Analyse the Owner’s Legal Position. SSL, 1959, pp. 234 ff.

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  135. I am indebted for the clarification in the text to Niilo Jääskinen who has demonstrated in our discussions the imprecision of the set of concepts in my earlier writings. Cf. Aarnio, On Legal Reasoning, pp. 272 ff. and Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 50 ff.

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  136. Tolonen, Juha, op. cit., pp. 36 ff., cf. pp. 174 ff.

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  137. Saarenpää, Tasajaon periaate, p. 22.

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  138. Peczenik, ‘Norms and Reality’, in Essays in Legal Theory. 1969, pp. 9 ff. and Peczenik, ‘Empirical Foundations of Legal Dogmatics’, in ibid., pp. 60 ff.

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  139. Aarnio, Aulis, Jääskinen Niilo, Pöyhönen Juha and Uusitalo Jyrki, Paradigms, Change and Progress in Legal Dogmatics (in print); Section 2. See also Ralf Dreier’s excellent analysis in: ‘Zur Theoriebildung in der Jurisprudenz’ in Recht-Moral-Ideologie, 1981, pp. 70 ff. See also Dalberg-Larsen, Jørgen, Five Essays on Legal Science, pp. 68 ff., especially pp. 80 ff.

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  140. A detailed analysis is to be found in Aarnio, Perillisen oikeusasemasta, pp. 49 ff. (German summary), and for some comments on this, Saarenpää, ‘Court Decisions as the Focus of Study, pp. 128 ff. See also Aarnio, ‘En analys av arvinges rättsliga ställning’. Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska Föreningen i Finland 6 (1980), pp. 363 ff.

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  141. See Ross, On Law and Justice, pp. 199 ff. Cf. Borum, O. A.,Arvefaldet, pp. 22 ff. and Malmström, Åke, Successionsrättsliga studier, pp. 38 ff. and pp. 198 ff.

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  142. Zitting, Simo, ‘An Attempt to Analyse the Owner’s Legal Position, SSL, 1959, pp. 234 ff.

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  143. See Zitting, op. cit. p. 229.

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  144. See Aarnio, Perillisen oikeusasemasta, pp. 89 ff. for an analysis of these doctrines.

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  145. Legal dogmatics which attempts to construct a systematic framework can be called theoretical legal dogmatics. See Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 69 ff. and pp. 231 ff. as well as Aarnio, ‘The Significance of the Theoretical Element in Legal Research’, in: Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence, pp. 123 ff. Cf. also Peczenik, Aleksander, ‘Legal Research, Growth of Science and Moral Theory’, pp. 137 ff., especially pp. 146 ff.

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  1. Department of Civil Law, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Aulis Aarnio

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© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Aarnio, A. (1987). The Methodology of Interpretation in Legal Dogmatics. In: The Rational as Reasonable. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4700-9_3

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