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The Ontology of Law

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The Rational as Reasonable

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 4))

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Abstract

The sector of philosophy termed ontology examines the basic elements and the structure of the world. One basic point of contention in ontology is between nominalism and (conceptual) realism. With reference to Occam’s razor (the prohibition against assuming unnecessary entities) the nominalists accept only individual entities in their ontology. D. M. Armstrong describes the nominalist point of view as follows: “The fundamental contention of Nominalism is that all things that exist are only particulars.”1 Only these particulars are really existing. Conceptual realists would grant an independent existence also (yet not necessarily only) to concepts on a higher level, for example to the roundness of a thing. These exist regardless of a conscious subject. Conceptualism has represented a mediating position between these two: general concepts exist in the mind of the conscious subject. The point of departure for the conventionalist is that ontological commitments depend on the language used. This, in turn, is open to agreement, which means that also ontology is a matter of convention.2

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Notes

  1. Armstrong, D. M., Nominalism & Realism: Universals & Scientific Realism. Volume I, p. 12. Cf. also Niiniluoto, op. cit., pp. 123 ff.

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  2. Cf. for example Tolonen, Juha, Der Allgemeine Erklährungshintergrund der wirtschaftlichen Ordnung und seine Anwendung auf das Aktiengesellschaftsrecht, pp. 17 ff.

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  3. Finch, Henry Le Roy, Wittgenstein — the Later Philosophy, pp. 243–244.

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  4. Ibid., p. 243.

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  5. In the theory of law, this type of ontology has been defended by Osvi Lahtinen. Cf. his article ‘Kuolinpesä-konstruktiosta’, LM 1955, pp. 112 ff. and a comment on this article, Aarnio ‘On Finnish Legal Theory in the 20th Century’, in Legal Point of View, pp. 25 ff.

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  6. Niiniluoto, op. cit., p. 129.

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  7. Klami, Finalistinen oikeusteoria, pp. 3 ff. See also Klami, ‘Dualism of Law’, In: Objektivierung des Rechtsdenkens, pp. 475 ff.

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  8. Popper, Karl R., Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, pp. 74 and 154 ff.

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  9. Niiniluoto, op. cit., p. 129. Cf. also Popper, op. cit., pp. 156–160, which deals with the objectivity of World 3 and its nature as a Man-made product. Regarding the contingence and necessary existence of norms, see von Wright, G. H., Norm and Action, pp. 107 ff. In this connection it should be noted that if the ontology accepts so-called institutional facts in addition to entities and properties, many traditional problems regarding existence will find a solution. It is not, however, self-evident where (in the ontological sense) facts receive their institutional nature. For example Searle connects them with so-called constitutive rules, in which case we have come around once again to the problem of the existence of rules. Regarding constitutive rules and the concept of the institutional fact, see Searle, J. R., Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, and also Searle, What is a Speech Act?, pp. 39 ff.

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  10. See Makkonen, op. cit., pp. 119 ff. Hans Kelsen often specifically equated existence with validity. He writes, “Mit dem Worte ‘geltung’ bezeichnen wir die spezifische Existenz einer Norm”, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd Ed. p. 9. As will be observed in the following (Sections 3.2 and 3.4) sentence (1) has not been turned into sentence (2) in the sense intended by Kelsen.

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  11. Regarding the existence of a norm, see also von Wright, G. H., Norm and Action, pp. 107 ff. and Sintonen, Matti, Problems of Interpretation and Truth in Legal Dogmatics, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 2, p. 83. From a legal point of view, see also Peczenik, Aleksander, Legal Data: An Essay About the Ontology of Law, pp. 99 ff.

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  12. Wróblewski, Jerzy, ‘Verification and Justification in the Legal Sciences’. Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 1 (1979), pp. 207 ff. See also Wróblewski, ‘Dilemmas of the Normativistic Concept of Legal System’, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 5 (1984), pp. 320 ff. where Wróblewski presents a more detailed analysis of the problem. Cf. Ross, Alf, Validity and the Conflict Between Legal Positivism and Natural Law, pp. 76 ff.

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  13. See also Aarnio, Aulis, ‘On the Validity, Efficacy, and Acceptability of Legal Norms’. In: Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence, pp. 152 ff. Cf. Guastini, Riccardo, ‘A Tentative Analysis of Two Juristic Sentences’, pp. 573 ff.

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  14. Kelsen, Hans, Reine Rechtslehre, pp. 209 ff. Seppo Laakso gives an exceptionally lucid analysis of the matter. In: Oikeuden systeemiyhteys, pp. 51 ff. Regarding Kelsen’s theory, see e.g. Raz, Joseph, The Concept of a Legal System, pp. 93 ff. See also Laakso, ‘Puhtaan oikeusopin problematiikkaa’, Oikeustiede 1980, pp. 150 ff.

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  15. See e.g. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, pp. 206–208. According to Kelsen, the fundamental norm is a logical necessity (“logisch unerlässich”). Such a conception, however, was rather late in being developed in Kelsen’s theory. In this connection see Laakso, ‘Puhtaan oikeusopin problematiikkaa’, pp. 152–153.

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  16. Kelsen, op. cit., pp. 208 ff.

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  17. Peczenik, Grundlagen der juristischen Argumentation, pp. 42 ff.

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  18. See here especially the criticism presented by Hermann Klenner about the “emptiness” of the Kelsenian system. Klenner, Vom Recht der Natur zur Natur des Rechts, pp. 139 ff., and Klenner, Rechtsleere, passim. See also Peschka, Vilmos, Die Theorie der Rechtsnormen, pp. 224 ff.

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  19. Alchourrón, Carlos — Bulygin, Eugenio, Normative Systems, pp. 94 ff. For a more detailed analysis, see Peczenik, ‘On the Nature and Function of the Grundnorm’, pp. 282 ff. See also Raz, op. cit., pp. 95 ff. and Vernengo, Roberto J., ‘La Funcion Sistematica de la Norma Fundamenta’, pp. 3 ff., especially pp. 17 ff.

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  20. Kelsen, op. cit., p. 219. The giving of a norm and its efficacy are conditions of the validity of the norm (Bedingung der Geltung) but the foundation (Grund) of a norm is always another, superior norm, and ultimately the fundamental norms. Regarding efficacy, see also Raz, op. cit., pp. 203 ff. See also Petev, Valentin, ‘Rechtsquellenlehre und Reine Rechtslehre’, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 5, pp. 274–277.

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  21. Kelsen, Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und Rechtspositivismus, pp. 8–9 and 18. See also Reine Rechtslehre, pp. 1–3.

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  22. Wróblewski, ‘Verification and Justification in the Legal Sciences’, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 1 p. 212 ff. See also Weinberger, Ota, ‘Logik, Wirklichkeit und Positivität in der Reinen Rechtslehre’, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 5 (1984), pp. 425 ff., especially pp. 436 ff. where Weinberger analyses the existence of law from the Kelsenian point of view.

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  23. Peczenik ‘On the Nature and Function of the Grundnorm’, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 2, pp. 279 ff. and Peczenik, The Basis of Legal Justification, pp. 2 ff. and Peczenik, Grundlagen der juristischen Argumentation, pp. 5 ff. Regarding the concept of transformation, see Aarnio, Alexy, and Peczenik, Rechtstheorie 2 (1981), pp. 136 ff.

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  24. Regarding the concept of “underpinning reasons”, see MacCormick, Legal Theory and Legal Reasonings, pp. 64 ff. and pp. 138–140.

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  25. Cf. about “minimum demands” e.g. Hart, op. cit., pp. 189 ff.

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  26. Regarding this matter see e.g. Ilium, Knud, ‘Some Reflection on the Method of Legal Science and on Legal Reasoning’. SSL 1968 pp. 49 ff. and Ilium, Lov og ret, pp. 53 ff.

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  27. See about organic reactions, see Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, pp. 182 ff. and Ross, op. cit. pp. 66 ff.

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  28. Holmes, Oliver Wendell, ‘The Path of the Law’, in Collective Legal Papers, 1921, p. 173.

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  29. See also Summers, Robert S., Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory, especially p. 239 ff. and Summers, ‘Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought — A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory about Law and Its Use’, Cornell Law Review 66 (1981), pp. 861 ff. and esp. pp. 904 ff. Summers remarks give a clear picture of the goals and contents of the tendency known as American realism.

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  30. See also Krawietz, Werner, Juristische Entscheidung und wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis, pp. 97 ff.

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  31. Cf. Benditt, op. cit., pp. 12 ff.

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  32. von Wright, G. H., ‘Normien eksistenssi’. Lecture (mimeograph), passim.

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  33. Regarding this distinction see Hart, op. cit., pp. 77 ff. Ross (op. cit., p. 46) observes that a primary norm is always a directive for the judge.

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  34. Frank, Jerome, Law and the Modern Mind, p. 134 ff. See also Benditt, op. cit., pp. 10–11 and Summers, ‘Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought’, p. 896 ff.

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  35. Ross, Om ret og retfaerdighed, p. 55. This is a literal translation, with minor stylistic adjustments. Thus, “conditions” has been put instead of “conditioning facts”. Cf. Ross, On Law and Justice, pp. 42 ff., where the translator of that book omitted the words “justify” and “justification”, and inserted the words “form the basis” and “reasoning” instead of them.

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  36. Ross, Om ret og retfaerdighed, p. 41. A literal translation with very minor stylistic adjustments. In On Law and Justice Ross writes as follows:

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  37. See also Aarnio and Peczenik, Mas alia del realismo, Section 2.

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  38. Ross, op. cit., pp. 48 ff. See also Bjarup, Jes, Skandinavischer Realismus, pp. 68 ff., Strömholm, op. cit., p. 100 and Lauridsen, Preben Stuer, Studier i retspolitisk argumentation, pp. 125 ff. and p. 234 ff. See also in general Bulygin, Eugenio, 4E1 Concepto de Vigencia en Alf Ross, pp. 3 ff.

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  39. Ross, op. cit., pp. 38 ff.

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  40. Aarnio and Peczenik, Mas alla del realismo, Section 7.

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  41. Jørgensen, Stig, Law and Society, pp. 86 ff. and Jørgensen, Argumentation and Decision, pp. 381 ff.

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  42. Benditt, op. cit., pp. 13 ff.

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  43. Makkonen, Zur Problematik der juridischen Entscheidung, p. 59. See also Hart, op. cit., p. 143.

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  44. Hart, op. cit., pp. 132 ff and especially pp. 141–142.

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  45. Hart criticizes Ross’ view also in another respect, i.e. referring to the fact that Ross does not deal with the formal validity. Hart, op. cit., pp. 28 ff. and pp. 100 ff.

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  46. Ross has answered to the criticism pointing out that the main reason for the confusion is the ambiguous meaning of the word “validity”. When Ross speaks about (factual) validity, Hart discusses about the existence of a norm. To my mind, Ross is right in this respect. Hart himself writes, e.g. that when we assert that a legal system exists “we in fact refer in compressed, portemantean form to a number of heterogeneous social facts”. The truth of this assertion can be confirmed by “reference to actual practice; to the way in which courts identify what is to count as law”. Hart, op. cit. pp. 245–246.

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  47. Here it is also very important to note how the Fascist concept of valid law was based on “general view of law and justice”. What is in accordance with the consciousness of people was the real expression of (Fascist) German law. See e.g. Dietze, H. H., Naturrecht in der Gegenwart, p. 184 and in general Kaufman, Arthur, Rechtsphilosophie und Nationalsozialismus, pp. 19ff.

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  48. This kind of conception is really very alien to the view defended in this contribution although the basic idea of the connection between the valid law and societal value base is a parallel one. Cf. what is observed later regarding the views of Otto Brusiin (Note 44). See also Aarnio, ‘Eternal and Changing Law’. In: Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence, pp. 94 ff.

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  49. Niiniluoto, Ilkka, ‘On the Truth of Norm Propositions’. Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 3 (1981), pp. 171 ff. See also Niiniluoto, ‘On Truth and Argumentation in Legal Dogmatics’, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 2 (1981), pp. 53 ff.

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  50. Niiniluoto, Beiheft 3. p. 176.

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  1. Department of Civil Law, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Aulis Aarnio

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© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Aarnio, A. (1987). The Ontology of Law. In: The Rational as Reasonable. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4700-9_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4700-9_2

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