Abstract
It is because of the possibility of argumentation which provides reasons, but not compelling reasons, that it is possible to escape the dilemma: adherence to an objectively and universally valid truth, or recourse to suggestion and violence to secure acceptance for our opinions and decisions. The theory of argumentation will help to develop what a logic of value judgments has tried in vain to provide, namely the justification of the possibility of a human community in the sphere of action when this justification cannot be based on a reality or objective truth.1
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Notes
Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 514.
Ray E. McKerrow, ‘Rhetorical Validity: An Analysis of Three Perspectives on the Justification of Rhetorical Argument,’ Journal of the American Forensic Association 13 (1977), 133–141.
‘Rhetorical Validity,’ 135.
Ray E. McKerrow, ‘Rationality and Reasonableness in a Theory of Argument,’ in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 113–114.
Robert Audi, ‘A Theory of Practical Reasoning,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1980), 32.
J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, ‘Introduction: The Field of Argumentation,’ Advances, p. xi.
Walter Weimer, Notes on the Methodology of Scientific Research, (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1979), p. 9.
McKerrow, ‘Rationality and Reasonableness,’ p. 115.
David Annis, ‘A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification,’ American Philosophical Quartely 15 (1978), 213; see Hilary Kornblith, ‘Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory,’ Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), 600-603.
Nicholas Rescher, ‘Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization,’ Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974), 704–705.
Kornblith, ‘Beyond Foundationalism,’ 601–603; for a brief critique of Rescher’s theory, see Mark Pastin, ‘Foundationalism Redux,’ Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974), 709-710.
Weimer, p. 9.
Keith Lehrer, ‘systematic Justification: Selections from Knowledge’, in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, ed. George Pappas and Marshall Swain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1978), p. 291; see McKerrow, ‘Rationality and Reasonableness,’ p. 116.
Weimer, p. 48.
Annis, 213-219.
Annis, 215.
Annis, 215.
Annis, 216.
Annis, 217-218; see Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958).
Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 167.
McKerrow, ‘Rationality and Reasonableness,’ pp. 120–121.
Rescher, 708.
George Pappas, ‘Ongoing Knowledge,’ Synthese 55 (1983), 253–267.
McKerrow, ‘Rationality and Reasonableness,’ pp. 108–112.
Joseph Margolis, ‘Pragmatism Without Foundations,’ American Philosphical Quarterly 21 (1984), 76.
Karl-Otto Apel, Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans, by Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 282, 280; quoted in Margolis, 77.
Margolis, 77.
Margolis, 76.
Chaim Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities, trans. William Kluback (Boston, MA: D. Reidel, 1979), p. 56; See Perelman, ‘The New Rhetoric and the Rhetoricians: Remembrances and Comments,’ QJS 70 (1984), 189.
Perelman, Humanities, p. 55.
Perelman, Justice, Law, and Argument (Boston, MA: D. Reidel, 1980), p. 58.
Perelman, Justice, p. 58.
Perelman, Humanities, p. 58.
Perelman, Humanities, p. 111.
Perelman, Humanities, p. 114.
Perelman, Humanities, p. 115; see William Kluback and M. Becker, ‘The Signif-icance of Chaim Perelman’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,’ Revue Internationale de Philosophie 33 (1979), 33-46.
Evelyn Barker, ‘A Neo-Aristotelian Approach to Dialectical Reasoning,’ Revue Internationale de Philosophie 34 (1980), 482–489. See Perelman, Justice, p. 150.
Perelman, Humanities, pp. 117–123.
Perelman, Humanities, p. 71.
Walter R. Fisher, ‘Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument,’ Communication Monographs 51 (1984), 4–6.
Perelman, Humanities, pp. 117–118.
Perelman, Justice, p. 65.
Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, trans. J. Petrie (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 97.
Perelman, Idea of Justice, p. 97.
Perelman, Idea of Justice, p. 132.
Perelman, Humanities, p. 127.
Perelman, Justice, p. 170.
Perelman, Justice, p. 173.
Perelman, Idea of Justice, p. 117.
Perelman, Idea of Justice, p. 133.
Perelman, ‘Remembrances and Comments,’ 193; see Perelman, ‘Philosophy and Rhetoric,’ in Advances, trans. Judy F. Merryman, p. 296; Perelman, Justice, p. 61.
William D. Harpine, ‘Can Rhetoric and Dialectic Serve the Purposes of logic,’ Philosophy and Rhetoric 18 (1985), 96–112.
Perelman, Justice, p. 61.
Perelman, New Rhetoric, pp. 83–85; see Perelman, Humanities, p. 159; J. Robert Cox, ‘The Die is Cast: Topical and Ontological Dimensions of the Locus of the Irreparable,’ QJS 68 (1982), 227-239.
Perelman, Justice, p. 155.
See Harold Zyskind, ‘Introduction,’ in Perelman, Humanities, ix–xxii. (Reprinted from ‘The New Rhetoric and Formalism,’ Revue Internationale de Philosophie 33 (1979), 18-32.)
Perelman, Idea of Justice, pp. 81–82.
Perelman, Idea of Justice, pp. 82, 85.
Perelman, Justice, p. 73.
Eric Wm. Skopec, ‘Rhetoric, Knowledge, and the Universal Audience in Chaim Perelman’s New Rhetoric’ paper presented at SCA Doctoral Honors Seminar, Temple Univ., (1972), p. 6.
Perelman, ‘Remembrances and Comments,’ 190–192; Perelman is responding to “errors” in several essays: see John Ray, “Perelman’s Universal Audience, QJS 64 (1978), 361-75; Joseph Wenzel, ‘Perspectives on Argument,’ in Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation, ed. Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell (Annandale, VA:SCA/AFA, 1980), 112-133.
Perelman, Justice, p. 72; see Perelman, ‘Remembrances and Comments,’ 191.
Perelman, Justice, pp. 72–73; see Perelman,‘Philosophy and Rhetoric,’ p. 293.
Perelman, Humanities, p. 60; see Perelman, ‘Philosophy and Rhetoric,’ p. 293.
Perelman, Justice, p. 74.
Perelman, Justice, p. 74.
Perelman, Justice, p. 63.
Perelman, Justice, p. 65.
Perelman, Justice, pp. 163–174.
Perelman, ‘Remembrances and Comments,’ 193.
Perelman, ‘Philosophy and Rhetoric,’ 293.
Perelman, ‘Philosophy and Rhetoric,’ 293.
Perelman, ‘Rhetoric and Politics,’ Philosophy and Rhetoric 17 (1984), 133.
Michel Foucault, ‘Politics and Ethics,’ in Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Catherine Porter (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), p. 374.
Gilbert Harman, ‘Reasoning and Explanatory Coherence,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1980), 154.
See Ray E. McKerrow, ‘Critical Rhetoric and the Discourse of Power,’ paper presented at SCA Convention, Chicago, 1984.
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McKerrow, R.E. (1986). Pragmatic Justification and Perelman’s Philosophical Rhetoric. In: Golden, J.L., Pilotta, J.J. (eds) Practical Reasoning in Human Affairs. Synthese Library, vol 183. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4674-3_11
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