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Likeness to Truth pp 21–33Cite as

Popper on Truthlikeness

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Part of the book series: The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science ((WONS,volume 30))

Abstract

It is now an accepted truism that no scientific theory can be verified. According to Karl Popper it is also impossible to raise the probability of any sufficiently comprehensive theory by accumulating evidence in favour of it. Popper has repeatedly claimed that a high probability is not, contrary to a large body of opinion, one of the desiderata for a good scientific theory. His arguments are rather numerous and just a few of the major ones will be considered here.

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References

  1. For an account of his disagreement with the views of the logical positivists, see Popper’s article ‘The Demarcation Between Science and Metaphysics’ in his [1963], pp. 253–92.

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  2. Popper [1963], pp. 217–218.

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  3. See, for example, Hintikka and Pietarinen [1966], and Carnap [ 1966 ].

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  4. Popper [1959], p. 410.

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  5. Popper [1963], pp. 215–250.

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  6. ibid., p. 234 and p. 392. Also, Popper [1972], p. 52 and p. 331.

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  7. Tichy [1974], Miller [1974]. See also Harris [1974]. (A slightly more restricted result, for finitely axiomatizable theories, was proved by Hempel in 1970, but not published).

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  8. See Tichy [1974], p. 151, fn. 2.

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  9. Miller [1974], p. 167.

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  10. Popper [1966], pp. 352–353.

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  11. Popper [1972], pp. 333–335.

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  12. Criticisms similar to these were first made by Miller in his [1972].

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  13. See Tichy [1974], pp. 157–159, and Vetter [1977], p. 372.

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  14. Tichy [1974], p. 159.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, Otago University, New Zealand

    Graham Oddie

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  1. Graham Oddie
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Oddie, G. (1986). Popper on Truthlikeness. In: Likeness to Truth. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 30. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4658-3_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4658-3_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8570-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4658-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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