Abstract
Reference has already been made to the fact that, owing to the inexhaustibility of experience, a certain incongruence between thoughts and facts always remains to be taken account of. Although our conceptions are adapted to a complex of circumstances, other circumstances outside of this, nevertheless, come into play; these we are not acquainted with, and do not perceive; these we have not in our power, and accordingly can neither introduce nor exclude them arbitrarily. The totality of these circumstances, which become operative without our expectation, and without our cooperation either mental or practical, we may call chance. Now it is the nature of the case that the defective adaptation of the psychical life to the physical makes itself sensible by such chance circumstances, and that further adaptation is even promoted by them. In fact, chance plays a principal part, not only in the development of knowledge, but also in the transformation of practical life. This has been discussed in detail elsewhere, and only a few supplementary remarks are to follow here.1
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Mach, E. (1986). Revision of Scientific Views Caused by Chance Circumstances. In: McGuinness, B. (eds) Principles of the Theory of Heat. Vienna Circle Collection, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4622-4_35
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4622-4_35
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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