Abstract
There are, it can be argued, two dominant approaches to rational choice extensively used in decision theory and economics:
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(1)
Internal consistency: Rational choice is seen, in this approach, simply in terms of internal consistency of choice.
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(2)
Self-interest pursuit: The rationality of choice is identified here with the unfailing pursult of self-interest.
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Sen, A. (1986). Rationality and Uncertainty. In: Daboni, L., Montesano, A., Lines, M. (eds) Recent Developments in the Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 47. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4616-3_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4616-3_1
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