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Conflicts of Obligation

  • Fred Feldman
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy book series (PSSP, volume 35)

Abstract

In the preceding chapters of this book, I have introduced a variety of concepts of absolute (nonconditional) obligation. Among these are individual moral obligation, individual prudential obligation, social obligation, and civic obligation. I have also introduced and discussed some forms of “collective” obligation — group moral and prudential obligation, for example. There is also the concept of the ought-to-be. Each of these is a “doing-the-best-we-can” concept of obligation, defined by appeal to some concept of possibility and some concept of value. In addition to all of these, there are also some concepts of obligation that have not been discussed here. Among these are various society- and code-relative forms of obligation, such as legal obligation and etiquettical obligation. Such concepts as these are not doing-the-best-we-can concepts of obligation. They would require a rather different sort of analysis.

Keywords

Moral Obligation Moral Dilemma Moral Code Good World Moral Conflict 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes To Chapter 9

  1. 1a.
    Ruth Barcan Marcus, ‘Moral Dilemmas and Consistency,’ The Journal of Philosophy LXXVII (1980), 121–136;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 1b.
    Bas C. van Fraassen, ‘Values and the Heart’s Command,’ The Journal of Philosophy LXX (1973), 5–19;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 1c.
    Bernard Williams, ‘Ethical Consistency,’ in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 173–176.Google Scholar
  4. 1d.
    Another defense of the view can be found in E. J. Lemmon, ‘Moral Dilemmas,’ The Philosophical Review LXXI (1962), 139–158.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 2.
    J. P. Sartre, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism,’ in Walter Kaufman, ed., Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York: Meridian, 1956), pp. 295–298.Google Scholar
  6. 3.
    J. P. Sartre, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism,’ in Walter Kaufman, ed., Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York: Meridian, 1956), Op. cit., p. 125.Google Scholar
  7. 4.
    J. P. Sartre, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism,’ in Walter Kaufman, ed., Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York: Meridian, 1956), Ibid.Google Scholar
  8. 5.
    Ruth Barcan Marcus, ‘Moral Dilemmas and Consistency,’ The Journal of Philosophy LXXVII (1980), Marcus, op. cit., p. 131.Google Scholar
  9. 6.
    Bernard Williams, ‘Ethical Consistency,’ in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), Williams, op. cit., p. 175.Google Scholar
  10. 7.
    Terrance C. McConnell, ‘Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy VIII, 2 (June, 1978), 276.Google Scholar
  11. 8.
    Alan Donagan, ‘Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems,’ The Journal of Philosophy LXXXI, 6 (June, 1984), 305.Google Scholar
  12. 13.
    For an example of this approach, see Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, abridged edition (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 106–109.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fred Feldman
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Massachusetts at AmherstUSA

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