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Doing the Best We Can pp 45–69Cite as

Moral Objections to MO

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Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy ((PSSP,volume 35))

Abstract

The sort of neo-utilitarian approach that I advocate has been subjected of a fair amount of criticism. I think it will be useful to spend some time considering and evaluating some of this criticism. I want to do this for two different reasons. In the first place, by explaining how I would reply to these objections, I hope to show that my approach is rationally defensible. The second reason for considering the objections seems to me to be more important. It is this: the presentation of the objections and replies will enable the reader to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and purpose of the theory.

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Notes to Chapter 3

  1. This topic is discussed in Dan Brock’s ‘Recent Work in Utilitarianism,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973), 250–251.

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  2. He there cites several relevant papers. In my view, one of the most interesting discussions can be found in R. E. Bales, ‘Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971), 257–265.

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  3. See also J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1961).

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  4. Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, abridged edition (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 109.

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  5. For an example of this sort of position, see Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1982).

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  6. An excellent, though somewhat dated, bibliography of this topic can be found in Nicholas Rescher, Distributive Justice (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 137–139.

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  7. The article appeared in The Philosophical Review 85 (1976), 449–487.

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  8. In ‘Utilitarianism and Past and Future Mistakes,’ Noûs 10 (1976), 195–219.

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  9. The objection made by Goldman and Sobel provoked several comments, and eventually led to at least one reconsideration. Among these are: Lars Bergström, ‘Utilitarianism and Future Mistakes,’ Theoria 43 (1977), 84–102

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  10. Michael McKinsey, ‘Levels of Obligation,’ Philosophical Studies 35 (1979), 385–395

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  11. Holly Smith Goldman, ‘Doing the Best One Can,’ Values and Morals, ed. by A. I. Goldman and J. Kim (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp. 185–214

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  12. P. S. Greenspan, ‘Oughts and Determinism: A Response to Goldman,’ The Philosophical Review 87 (1978), 77–83.

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  13. Useful discussion of Williams’ essay can be found in: Nancy Davis, ‘Utilitarianism and Responsibility,’ Ratio 22 (1980), 15–35

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  14. John Harris, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,’ Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974), 265–273

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  15. Harry Silverstein, ‘Utilitarianism and Group Coordination,’ Noûs XIII, 3, (September, 1979), 335–360.

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  16. Williams extended the discussion in ‘Utilitarianism and Moral Self-Indulgence,’ Modern British Philosophy 4th Series, ed. by H. D. Lewis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976), pp. 306–321, as well as in other papers.

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  17. John Harris, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,’ Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974) Williams, p. 99.

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  18. John Harris, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,’ Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974) Williams, p. 116.

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  19. John Harris, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,’ Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974) Williams, p. 117.

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  20. John Harris, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,’ Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974) Williams, p. 99.

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  21. John Harris, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,’ Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974) Williams, p. 110.

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  22. John Harris, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,’ Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974) Williams, p. 116.

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  23. John Harris, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,’ Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974) Williams, pp. 115–116.

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  24. John Harris, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,’ Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974) Williams, p. 117.

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  25. Principa Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 20.

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  26. For an extended, insightful discussion of this point, see R. E. Bales, ‘Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-making Procedure?’, American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971), 257–265.

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  27. John Harris, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity,’ Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974) Williams, p. 99.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA

    Fred Feldman

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  1. Fred Feldman
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Feldman, F. (1986). Moral Objections to MO. In: Doing the Best We Can. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4570-8_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4570-8_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8531-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4570-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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