• Fred Feldman
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy book series (PSSP, volume 35)


One of the main claims I want to make concerning the views I have presented in the preceding chapters of this book is a claim about their unity. I have been trying here to provide a unified set of accounts of the oughts and iffy oughts of ordinary English. When I say that this set of accounts is “unified”, I mean to draw attention to the fact that, insofar as possible, I have analyzed these normative notions by appeal to closely related components of a single, relatively simple metaphysical and axiological system.


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Notes to Chapter 10

  1. 1.
    W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (New York: Oxford University Press, 1930).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Analysis 28 (1968), 141–142.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Analysis 24 (1963), 33–36.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 91.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    See, for example, ‘Acts, the Logic of Obligation, and Deontic Calculi,’ Philosophical Studies XIX (1968), 12–26.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fred Feldman
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Massachusetts at AmherstUSA

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