One of the main claims I want to make concerning the views I have presented in the preceding chapters of this book is a claim about their unity. I have been trying here to provide a unified set of accounts of the oughts and iffy oughts of ordinary English. When I say that this set of accounts is “unified”, I mean to draw attention to the fact that, insofar as possible, I have analyzed these normative notions by appeal to closely related components of a single, relatively simple metaphysical and axiological system.
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Notes to Chapter 10
- 1.W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (New York: Oxford University Press, 1930).Google Scholar
- 2.Analysis 28 (1968), 141–142.Google Scholar
- 3.Analysis 24 (1963), 33–36.Google Scholar
- 4.H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 91.Google Scholar
- 5.See, for example, ‘Acts, the Logic of Obligation, and Deontic Calculi,’ Philosophical Studies XIX (1968), 12–26.Google Scholar