Intentions: The Contents

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to study some possible accounts of the nature and role of intentions (contents) in light of an array of data we must first describe. Any plausible view must accomodate these data. We will examine some leading candidate theories. The view which emerges in the end is eclectic and lacks the unity each of the theories examined attempts to feature. This is due to the force of the complex data. A simplistic theory can seem plausible only because some of the data are ignored, so that we get a truncated version of the role of the contents of practical thinking, considering what to do, and intending to do some thing. We must attempt to balance the complexities we encounter with the need for a simple theory of the nature, structure and role of (even) simple intentions.

Causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum.