Abstract
Some causal efficacy is due to persons. And, some of the causal efficacy Due to persons is imparted by, not merely to, them. Further, some of the causal efficacy due to persons and imparted by them is imparted by and not merely to their physical, active bodies. Otherwise there in no agency. I will assume, with everyone at the outset, that the world contains agency of the kind found in some of a person’s comings Abstract goings, movings and changing of things.
The powers of seeing, hearing, remembering, distinguishing, judging, reasoning, are speculative powers; the power of executing any work of art or labour is active power.
Thomas Reid
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gustafson, D.F. (1986). Introduction. In: Intention and Agency. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4520-3_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4520-3_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8514-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4520-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive