Abstract
Computers do not think. This thesis is defended, initially, by distinguishing between agents and the actions they perform with instruments, and those operations which instruments themselves perform. Furthermore, it is argued that computers do not even perform the arithmetic operations, because they merely manipulate electrical impulses to which human beings have assigned certain numerical meanings. Numerical information in the true sense is not what computers deal with, since in order to be information symbols must have a relevance for the entity manipulating them.
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Dretske, F. (1986). Minds, Machines and Meaning. In: Mitcham, C., Huning, A. (eds) Philosophy and Technology II. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 90. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4512-8_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4512-8_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8510-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4512-8
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