Abstract
An extended critique of fear that computers are a threat to privacy. The argument is that although computers will, in fact, do away with privacy, privacy is not the absolute value it is often thought to be. The destruction of privacy will not create an inhuman but a more humane society.
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Schirmacher, W. (1986). Privacy as an Ethical Problem in the Computer Society. In: Mitcham, C., Huning, A. (eds) Philosophy and Technology II. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 90. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4512-8_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4512-8_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8510-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4512-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive