Abstract
The computational theory of perception rests on three principles: first, a scientific realism which takes visual objects to be verdical only if they exhibit the structure of physical objects in Euclidean space; second, an identity of mind and body, so that to see X is equivalent to having a brain state X’ which is the product of a computational process applied solely to the retinal image; and third, the machine principle, which states that to understand seeing is equivalent to knowing how to build a seeing machine. It is argued that all of these principles are fallacious.
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© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Heelan, P.A. (1986). Machine Perception. In: Mitcham, C., Huning, A. (eds) Philosophy and Technology II. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 90. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4512-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4512-8_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8510-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4512-8
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