Skip to main content

Fleck’s Contribution to Epistemology

  • Chapter
Cognition and Fact

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 87))

Abstract

Ludwik Fleck situated himself epistemologically in opposition to the two most prominant schools of the philosophy of science of his time: the Logical Positivism of Carnap, Schlick and others of the Vienna Circle, and the Historicism of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Jerusalem and the sociologists of knowledge (46-51)1. A brief statement of where he stood with respect to each is helpful.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Black, M.: 1962, Metaphors and Models, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cranston, M.: 1961, John Locke, Longmans Green, Harlow, Essex.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feyerabend, P.: 1975, Against Method, New Left Press, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gadamer, H.-G.: 1975, Truth and Method, Transl, of Wahrheit und Methode (Tubingen, 1960), Seabury Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gouldner, A.: 1970, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Basic Books, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Habermas J.: 1971, Knowledge andHuman Interests. Transi, of Erkenntnis und Interesse (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1961), Beacon Press, Boston.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanson, N. R.: 1958,Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge University Press, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heelan, P.: 1965, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity, Nijhoff, The Hague.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heelan, P.: 1970, ‘Complementarity, Context-dependence and Quantum Logic,’ Foundations of Physics 1, 95–110.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heelan, P.: 1971, ‘The Logic of Framework Transpositions,’ Internat. Philos. Qrtly. 11, 314–334.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heelan, P.: 1975a, ‘Hermeneutics of Experimental Science in the Context of the Life-World,’ pp. 7–50 in Ihde and Zaner (eds.) (1975).

    Google Scholar 

  • Heelan, P.: 1975b, ‘Heisenberg and Radical Theoretical Change,’ Zeit. f. Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie vi, 113–138.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heelan, P.: 1983, Space-perception and the Philosophy of Science, University of California Press, Berkeley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M.: 1962, Being and Time. Transi, of Sein und Zeit (Seventh ed., 1935), Harper and Row, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hesse, M.: 1963, Models and Analogies in Science, Sheed and Ward, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hesse, M.: 1980, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philoosphy of Science, Indiana University Press, Bloomington.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holton, G.: 1973, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: From Kepler to Einstein, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ihde, D. and Zaner, R. (eds.): Interdisciplinary Phenomenology, Nijhoff, The Hague.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, T. S.: 1962, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, T. S.: 1977, The Essential Tension, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. (eds.): 1970, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, L.: Progress and its Problems, University of California Press, Berkeley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Polanyi, M.: 1964, Personal Knowledge, Harper and Row, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Radnitzky, G.: 1973, Contemporary Schools of’ Metascience, 3rd enlarged ed., Regnery, Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Suppe, F.: 1974, Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, III.

    Google Scholar 

  • Toulmin, S.: 1972, Human Understanding, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1986 D. Reidel Publishing Company

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Heelan, P.A. (1986). Fleck’s Contribution to Epistemology. In: Cognition and Fact. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 87. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4498-5_15

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4498-5_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8504-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4498-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics