Abstract
Public interest arguments are often advanced to justify existing regulations. Regulation is said to be supplied in response to market imperfections (e.g. monopoly, externalities, imperfect consumer information) or inequitable market practices (e.g. dishonesty in trading). The pronounced public interest goals may, however, not be really present. A distinction must be made between the public pronouncements of the regulator and the real nature of the regulations. Legislatures may for instance couch special interest statutes in public interest terms for political reasons.
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Van den Bergh, R. (1986). Belgian Public Policy Towards the Retailing Trade. In: von der Schulenburg, JM.G., Skogh, G. (eds) Law and Economics and the Economics of Legal Regulation. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4442-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4442-8_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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