Abstract
The question that opens and insistently runs through Beyond Good and Evil is, posed for us by what Nietzsche calls “the will to truth,” the drive, need, tendency and desire to know the world for what it is and not be deceived about it.1 Forced by the will to truth to ask questions endlessly, we even question this will itself. “Indeed,” Nietzsche writes,
we came to a long halt at the question about the cause of this will—until we finally came to a complete stop before a still more basic question. We asked about the value of this will. Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance? (5:15, BGE 1)
To put the value of the will to truth into question is still an effort to determine the truth about this matter. As such, in the paradoxical manner characteristic of Nietzsche’s later writing, the question is itself prompted by the will to truth, which, in the very process of casting suspicion upon itself, secures its own perpetuation.
Error…is more intimately connected with animal existence and the soul continues longer in the state of error than in that of truth.
Aristotle, De Anima III 3 427b 1–2
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References
I shall refer to Nietzsche’s original text by citing the appropriate volume and page number of Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980). For the English translation I shall cite the acronym of the work and the appropriate section.
Ibid., translation slightly modified.
Cf., for example, 3: 469–471, 518; 11: 477, 506; GS 110, 265; WP 493.
The first clear statement of this view among English-speaking philosophers is to be found in Arthur Danto’s important book, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), chap. 3. It has since been adopted by many other writers.
Arthur Danto’s important book, Danto, p. 72.
Ernst Gombrich, Art and Illusion (New York: Pantheon, 1961), p. 63.
Cf. Gombrich’s title essay in Meditations on a Hobby-Horse (London: Phaidon, 1963).
Quoted in Douglas Cooper, The Cubist Epoch (London: Phaidon, 1970), p. 33.
John Searle, Intentionality (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 158–159. argues that this set of habits must be in a serious sense mental. One does not have to agree with this point in order to see the importance of the issue in question.
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© 1986 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster
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Nehamas, A. (1986). Will to Knowledge, Will to Ignorance and Will to Power in Beyond Good and Evil . In: Yovel, Y. (eds) Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4360-5_6
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