Duties, rights, and ends in the political order

Abstract

In much the same sense that autonomy is the crux of Kant’s moral theory, freedom is the fulcrum of his political theory, or theory of right (Rechtslehre). Kant maintains that freedom is “the one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity” (MM, 237). He defines “freedom” in this context as “independence from the constraint of another’s will,” albeit only “insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law.” There is, in fact, no way to define or characterize the concept of right — whether as law or justice (das Recht), as an entitlement or authorization of an individual person (ein Recht), or as a quality of an action (recht) — except in terms of freedom. Right as justice or law is “the aggregate of conditions under which the will [Willkür] of one person can be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” (ibid., 230). “Every act is right [recht] that in itself or in its maxim is such that the freedom of the will [Willkür] of each can coexist together with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (ibid., 230). And the universal law of right is: “act externally in such a way that the free use of your will [Willkü;r] can coexist together with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law” (ibid., 350). So, nothing of right can be defined apart from freedom, and freedom itself must be conceived as compatible with, say, equal freedom of everyone else, which, Kant apparently holds, can be assured (like moral autonomy) only by action compatible with universal law. In short, right, freedom, and universal law are mutually dependent concepts, though freedom is the pivotal one.