Universality and the categorical imperative

Abstract

No feature of Kant’s moral philosophy is better known than the categorical imperative. Yet it is far from obvious what role, or roles, Kant believes it to play in moral theory. Does it, for example, merely state what moral obligation or duty is?¹ Is it, in other words, merely a conceptual formula of the moral “ought” (in contrast to nonmoral “oughts”)? Or does the categorical imperative (perhaps in addition to the former role) inform us of which actions are and which are not morally obligatory? What, after all, is the categorical imperative about? What does it pertain to? Is it a principle of a good will, i.e., a command that we always act from duty, or out of respect for the moral law? (Indeed, what is the difference between the moral law and the categorical imperative?) Or is it a principle or criterion of moral Tightness? In terms of maxims, does the categorical imperative pertain to incentival maxims, or does it pertain to actional maxims? Finally, does Kant hold that this “supreme practical principle” (Gr. 428) has both functions? These are some of the chief questions to be considered in this chapter.