Abstract
The ‘inconveniences’ of anthropomorphism which Philo began to develop in Part IV are continued in Part V. Whereas Philo’s argument in Part IV concentrated on Cleanthes’ attempt to establish an external principle of order to the world, Philo’s argument in Part V concentrates on the ‘intelligence’ aspect of Cleanthes’ position.
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References
D. 165.
D. 143.
D. 166. In the next paragraph Philo says: “The discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature, are still objections, according to you; arguments, according to me. The farther we push our researches of this kind, we are still led to infer the universal cause of All to be vastly different from mankind, or from any object of human experience and observation.
D. 147.
“When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infery by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other ... But how this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance; may be difficult to explain.” (D. 149)
“It would surely be very ill received, replied Cleanthes; and I should be deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow that the proofs of a Deity amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance? The oeconomy of final causes? The order, proportion, and arrangement of every part.” (D. 144–145)
D. 169.
D. 166.
D. 166.
D. 166.
D. 143, my italics.
D. 168–169.
E. 136.
E. 137. See also E. 144–145.
E. 148.
Pike 166–167.
D. 169.
In the first Enquiry, Hume (prior to his critique of this method of reasoning) writes
D. 203.
D. 166.
D. 167.
“Given the empirical facts for which we are trying to account, isn’t this fanciful hypothesis as good as the hypothesis of design. It may even be better. Of course, if this alternative is as good as Cleanthes’ hypothesis, then there would be no empirical warrant for preferring one over the other. The hypothesis of design could then be dismissed as arbitrary. On the other hand, if this alternative is actually better, the conclusion would be that the hypothesis of design is probably false.” (Pike 165)
D. 168–169.
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© 1986 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht
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Tweyman, S. (1986). Hume’s Dialogues: Part V. In: Scepticism and Belief in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. International Archives of the History of Ideas/Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idees, vol 106. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4341-4_6
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