Abstract
One of the most exciting areas in economic theory is the study of incentives. Within this rubric a broad range of problems are currently being addressed. They range from the problems of social choice, to the economics of planning, to the character of labor contracts. The central theme of the research agenda concerns how the incentive structure affects the quality of information agents are willing to communicate. The principal question concerns how truthful revelation of information can be induced.1 Such questions are important whenever agents can profit from distorting information. The problem thus arises in all sorts of guises in economics. The purpose of this essay is to illustrate this point by focusing on three distinct areas, social choice, public finance, and economic planning.
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© 1986 Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing
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Ickes, B.W. (1986). Possibility Theorems, Incentives, and Progress in Economic Theory. In: Samuelson, L. (eds) Microeconomic Theory. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4219-6_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4219-6_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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