Abstract
Ronald McIntyre has written the account I should have written, situating Husserl judiciously with respect to several issues in Cognitivism. His basic criticism of my introduction to Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science is well taken. Husserl was not a computationalist. Still, I feel the two intuitions that led me to criticize Husserl as a cognitivist, and a computational one at that, remain intact, and I am happy to have this opportunity to thank McIntyre for his helpful criticism and to restate my analysis of the issues in a way which, I hope, will be more accurate and persuasive.
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© 1988 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Dreyfus, H.L. (1988). Husserl’s Epiphenomenology. In: Otto, H.R., Tuedio, J.A. (eds) Perspectives on Mind. Synthese Library, vol 194. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_8
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