Advertisement

Meaning and Mental Representation

Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 194)

Abstract

Husserl and Fodor both accept a representational theory of mind (RTM). Both individuate mental states by their contents, which are provided by mental representations or noematic Sinn. Both adhere to methodological solipsism; mental states are theoretically isolated from environmental and social causes and effects. Their principled blindness to mind-world causal connections ally Husserl and Fodor in a common antipathy to “naturalistic psychology” which would insist that mental states cannot be identified without considering their causes and the contexts in which they occur.

Keywords

Mental Representation Causal Theory Intentional Object Intentional Content Internalist Account 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1988

Authors and Affiliations

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations