Abstract
Husserl and Fodor both accept a representational theory of mind (RTM). Both individuate mental states by their contents, which are provided by mental representations or noematic Sinn. Both adhere to methodological solipsism; mental states are theoretically isolated from environmental and social causes and effects. Their principled blindness to mind-world causal connections ally Husserl and Fodor in a common antipathy to “naturalistic psychology” which would insist that mental states cannot be identified without considering their causes and the contexts in which they occur.
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© 1988 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Emmett, K. (1988). Meaning and Mental Representation. In: Otto, H.R., Tuedio, J.A. (eds) Perspectives on Mind. Synthese Library, vol 194. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8290-7
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