Abstract
The correspondence hypothesis is a conjecture to the effect that psychological phenomena correspond (in one-to-one fashion) to certain states and processes in people’s brains. It suggests that for each and every (different) psychological phenomenon there is a different brain state or process with which it is uniquely correlated. [1] This hypothesis, often referred to in philosophical literature as “The Principle of Psycho-Physical Isomorphism,” is purported to provide the empirical foundation on which a variety of conflicting mind-body theories are constructed, as well as the source of the “riddle” which such theories aim to unravel. [2]
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Footnotes
See Putnam, (i) “Minds and Machines,” in Hook (1961);
(ii) “Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life,” in O’Connor (1969);
(iii) “The Mental Life of Some Machines,” in O’Connor (1969).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Lurie, Y. (1988). Brain States and Psychological Phenomena. In: Otto, H.R., Tuedio, J.A. (eds) Perspectives on Mind. Synthese Library, vol 194. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8290-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4033-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive