Abstract
Consciousness is an embarrassment to functionalism and to the computational-representational theory of mind. Whatever the causal and/or computational role of a mental state, it seems that same function might be performed without consciousness. So functionalism or computationalism which would identify a mental state with its causal or computational role cannot account for consciousness. (Unless it can be shown that being conscious changes the causal or computational role of a mental state.) It would be convenient, then, for the functionalist or computationalist, if someone could show that consciousness does not exist.
Misc
When people speak of “consciousness”, Wittgenstein counselled, language has gone on holiday. Au contraire: When people speak against consciousness, consciousness has gone on a holiday. When philosophers question the existence of consciousness, they are out of touch with human experience. Theorizing has cut them off from a basic feature of even their own experience - viz., consciousness. Their position is intellectually schizoid.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Footnotes
Cf. D.W. Smith, “The Structure of (Self-) Consciousness”, Topoi, 1986, and a longer treatment in my The Circle of Acquaintance (forthcoming).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1988 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Smith, D.W. (1988). Rey Cogitans: The Unquestionability of Consciousness. In: Otto, H.R., Tuedio, J.A. (eds) Perspectives on Mind. Synthese Library, vol 194. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8290-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4033-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive