Intentional Transaction as a Primary Structure of Mind

Abstract

Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology addresses itself to issues that are integral to the study of mental experience. [1] In this respect, it would not be inappropriate to refer to Husserl’s philosophy as cognitive phenomenology. In fact, given Husserl’s emphasis on the importance of establishing the strictly scientific character of the philosophical enterprise, one can extend this claim even further: cognitive phenomenology is, if Husserl is correct, the only truly rigorous foundation for the enterprise of cognitive science. We will investigate this claim at the conclusion of this essay. But first, we need to understand Hussei’s position with respect to the nature and function of minds. Since Husserl’s reflections on the structure of mental experience developed in large part out of an attempt to resolve the enigma of objective reference, I will present a capsule view of his proposed resolution to this problem. In the process, I will attempt to show that Husserl viewed mental operations as transactions—specifically, intentional transactions—between the life of conscious subjectivity and all that stands over and against consciousness as an object or objective state of affairs. In the end, it may be possible to show that Husserl’s theory of intentionality should be a crucial ingredient in any attempt to model or comprehend the functional nature of the human mind.