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Knotty, Knotty: Comments on Nelson’s “New World Knot”

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Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 194)

Abstract

There is, I think, considerable agreement among philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists that a functional or computational theory of the mind faces two deep challenges—the Scylla and Charybdis of Qualia on one hand and Intentionality on the other. There is less agreement, of course, whether these problems have sunk the computational model, or have forced it to seek alternative routes to its goal of a materialist account of the mind, or simply stand as the tasks to be accomplished.

Keywords

Causal Power Conscious Experience Conscious State Intentional Content Recognition State 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Footnotes

  1. Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, in Block (1980a), pp. 216–222.Google Scholar
  2. Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States”, in Block, (1980a), pp. 223–231.Google Scholar

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© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1988

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