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Mechanism and Intentionality: The New World Knot

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Perspectives on Mind

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 194))

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Abstract

Mental life presents many holistic phenomena. Gestalt perception comes to mind as does the manifold of intentions—beliefs, desires, and actions—and the fabric of linguistic meanings. In this paper I want to argue that none of these wholes resist analysis except for conscious intentional attitudes. It seems we cannot get a theoretical grasp of the difference between tacit (unconscious or preconscious) beliefs, desires, etc. and conscious feeling-laden belief. As I shall endeavor to explain, perception, unconscious attitudes, linguistic competence, and even intellectual skills accompanied by raw feeling (kinesthetic sensation at the edge of attention while typing or playing a musical instrument) are explainable in principle within the computer paradigm. Conscious attitudes alone seem not to be explainable in such terms and are perhaps absolutely holistic.

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Footnotes

  • Nelson Goodman, Ways of World Making. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1978, pp. 4–5.

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  • This is no place to take up Kripke’s arguments against the identity theory, which many consider to be devastating. See Kripke (1980), also in Davidson and Harman (1972). I think his argument can be defused. See Nelson (1982) pp. 331–335; and my article “On Causal Reference”, forthcoming.

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  • D. Lewis, “General Semantics” in Davidson and Harman (1972), p. 170.

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© 1988 D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Nelson, R.J. (1988). Mechanism and Intentionality: The New World Knot. In: Otto, H.R., Tuedio, J.A. (eds) Perspectives on Mind. Synthese Library, vol 194. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8290-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4033-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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