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“Preference Reversals” and the Theory of Decision Making under Risk

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Risk, Decision and Rationality

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLB,volume 9))

Abstract

Preference reversal is an experimentally observed phenomenon in which subjects, when asked to choose between suitably matched pairs of lotteries and then to state the lowest amount of money they would be willing to accept in exchange for the right to participate in each of these lotteries, announce the lowest amount for the chosen lottery. Preference reversals were first reported by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and have since been replicated in numerous studies, e.g., Lindman (1971), Grether and Plott (1979), Pommerehne, Schneider and Zweifel (1982), Reilly (1982). The latter studies introduce variations in the experimental design to increase the motivation and reduce the possiblity of confusion and errors on the part of the subjects. By and large these studies reaffirm the existence of the preference reversal phenomenon.

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© 1988 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Karni, E., Safra, Z. (1988). “Preference Reversals” and the Theory of Decision Making under Risk. In: Munier, B.R. (eds) Risk, Decision and Rationality. Theory and Decision Library, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4019-2_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4019-2_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-8283-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-4019-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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