Synopsis
(1) Scientific realism maintains that natural science provides descriptive, accurate information about physical reality — that the objects of science exist as science claims them to be. (2) This position presupposes the essential correctness of natural science as we have it. But when science is seen in historical perspective, it becomes clear that there is no adequate justification for thinking that natural science as we now have it is actually correct. (3) Nor does it seem warranted to suppose that a future juncture will be reached when the science of the day correctly characterizes physical reality.
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Notes to Chapter One
Hilary Putnam Philosophical Papers (Vol. II, p. ix) Cambridge, 1980
Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge, 1983, see esp. pp. 36–37.
Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge, Oxford, 1972, p. 9.
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© 1987 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Rescher, N. (1987). Problems of Scientific Realism. In: Scientific Realism. Scientific Realism, vol 40. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3905-9_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3905-9_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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