Abstract
In this paper I propose to discuss some recent developments in game theory over the last twenty years.1 The main topics I will consider are difficulties with the classical cooperative solution concepts; the new theory of games with incomplete information; analysis of cooperative games by means of noncooperative bargaining models; perfect and imperfect equilibrium points; and the problem of equilibrium selection, by which I mean the problem of selecting one particular equilibrium point of a noncooperative game as the solution of this game. I will also discuss the solution theory developed by Reinhard Selten and me to deal with the equilibrium selection problem.
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© 1988 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Harsanyi, J.C. (1988). Some Recent Developments in Game Theory. In: Eberlein, G.L., Berghel, H. (eds) Theory and Decision. Theory and Decision Library, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3895-3_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3895-3_12
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