Abstract
In his pioneering analysis of sophisticated voting, Farquharson (1969) demonstrated that a chairman with both a regular and tie-breaking vote may do worse under the plurality procedure than if he had only a regular vote (no tie-breaker paradox). In a recent paper, we (Brams, Felsenthal, and Maoz, 1986) demonstrated that two related paradoxes can occur.
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References
Brams, Steven J., Dan S. Felsenthal, and Zeev Maoz: 1985. New Chairman Paradoxes. In Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport, ed. Andreas Dickmann and Peter Mitter. Heidelberg, FRG: Physica-Verlag; 1986, pp. 243–256.
Brams, Steven J, and Peter C. Fishburn: 1983. Approval Voting. Boston: Birkhäuser.
Farquharson, Robin: 1969. Theory of Voting. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Handel, Michael: 1981. Weak States in the International System. London: Frank Cass.
Riker, William H.: 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
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© 1988 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Brams, S.J., Felsenthal, D.S., Maoz, Z. (1988). Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting. In: Eberlein, G.L., Berghel, H. (eds) Theory and Decision. Theory and Decision Library, vol 50. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3895-3_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3895-3_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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