How Not to Talk About Conceptual Change in Science

Abstract

Conceptual change in science has been a “hot” topic for more than two decades. Yet, in spite of the strenuous efforts of a good number of philosophers and historians, our understanding of conceptual change is very poor. In spite of general acknowledgement of the importance of conceptual change, there is no general agreement about what it is, how it works, how it should be evaluated, or how far-reaching its consequences are. There is considerable agreement that major changes of theory (which, for better or worse, Kuhn 1970 has taught us to call “scientific revolutions”) are typically accompanied by some form of conceptual change. There is fairly general agreement that such conceptual change must be taken account of in examining the rationality of theory change and of the rationales offered by scientists for abandoning a theory or seeking to develop alternative theories. Conceptual change is often held to be of critical relevance to our understanding of progress in science and to our assessment of the ability of science to achieve such goals as maximizing truth and explanatory power, facilitating prediction or control, and achieving maximal simplicity of its theoretical foundations. An adequate understanding of the justification for conceptual change is often held to be a prerequisite for developing a satisfactory account of the rational processes (if any) governing the development, evaluation, and choice of theories.

I am grateful to Lorenz Krüger, Larry Laudan, Rachel Laudan, Jim Lennox, and Peter Machamer for criticisms of an earlier draft and especially to Catherine Elgin for an extensive critique that forced me to make a number of improvements in the paper. I am grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a Summer Stipend in support of research.